東京大学政策評価研究教育センター

CREPEDP-59

Number CREPEDP-59
Publication Date September 2019
Title Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments
Author(s) Yutaka Kayaba, Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama
Abstract We experimentally examine repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follow generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it.
Keywords Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Imperfect Private Monitoring, Experiments, Generous Tit-for-Tat, Retaliation Intensity
Other information Revised Version of CREPEDP-38
Paper in English (69 pages)