| Abstract |
This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability-related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, U.S.A. in the past centuries, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness and made it \non-disability." The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non-deaf. In the first stage, the non-deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into the deaf people, bilinguals, and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form
a trio to play a three-person bargaining game with in finite horizon, random proposers, and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.
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