東京大学政策評価研究教育センター

CREPEDP-7

Number CREPEDP-7
Publication Date April 2018
Title International Capital Market and Repeated Tax Competition
Author(s) Satoshi Kasamatsu and Hikaru Ogawa
Abstract We propose an infinitely repeated game of tax competition with an endogenous capital supply. Our results show that the larger the capital supply elasticity to interest rates, the easier it is for interregional tax coordination within a country to be achieved. The capital supply elasticity is lower when countries are less integrated into the international capital market, and vice versa. Thus, our finding suggests that the regions in the country with a lower (higher) degree of integration in the global market are less (more) likely to achieve tax coordination.
Keywords Repeated tax competition, Tax coordination, Endogenous capital supply.
Other information Paper in English (20 pages)