| Title | Credit Booms, Financial Crises and Macroprudential Policy |
|---|---|
| Date | 2019年8月22日（木） August 22, 10:25-12:10 |
| Venue | 東京大学学術交流棟（小島ホール）１階・第１セミナー室
[地図] Seminar Room No. 1, Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), University of Tokyo [MAP] |
| Speaker | 清滝信宏（Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Princeton University and CREPE) |
| Abstract | We develop a model of banking panics which is consistent with two features of the data: First, banking crises are usually preceded by credit booms. Second, nonetheless, credit booms often do not result in crises. That is, in the language of Gorton and Ordonez (2019), there can be "bad booms" as well as "good booms". We then study macro-prudential regulation in this kind of environment. We consider how the optimal policy weighs the benefits of preventing a crisis against the costs of stopping a good boom and analyze the features of optimal regulation. We show, for example, that countercyclical capital buffers are a critical feature of a successful macro-prudential policy. |
| Information | 英語での発表となります（Presentation in English） 主催：Macroworkshop |