| Title | "Job Matching under Constraints" (joint with Ning Sun and Ning Neil Yu) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2019年6月18日（火）June 18, 2019, 10:25-12:10 |
| Venue | 東京大学経済学研究科・学術交流棟（小島ホール）１階・第１セミナー室にて開催 [地図] Seminar Room No. 1, Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), University of Tokyo [MAP] |
| Speaker | 小島武仁（Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University and CREPE) |
| Abstract | In a Kelso-Crawford job matching framework, we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on sets of doctors that hospitals can hire. Constraints preserve the substitutes condition if and only if they are "generalized interval constraints," slightly generalizing "interval constraints" that specify minimum and maximum numbers of doctors allowed. Given the substitutes condition, a mild assumption ensures existence of competitive equilibria; equilibrium salaries form a lattice; a rural hospital theorem holds. We study comparative statics about changing interval constraints, and also show that instead of compelling hospitals to obey interval constraints, the government can entice them through subsidy and taxation. |
| Information | 英語での発表となります（Presentation in English） 主催：Microeconomics Workshop |