| Title | "Infinitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games: Comparing Teams with Individuals" (co-authored with David Cooper（Florida State University)) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2019年6月14日（金）June 14, 2019, 17:00-18:30 |
| Venue | 東京大学経済学研究科・学術交流棟（小島ホール）２階・小島コンファレンスルームにて開催 [地図] Kojima Conference Room, Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), University of Tokyo [MAP] |
| Speaker | John Kagel (The Ohio State University) |
| Abstract | Teams are less cooperative than individuals in infinitely repeated PD games to begin with, but are more cooperative with experience. Strategies from team discussions are similar to maximum likelihood estimates at an aggregate level. However, discussions identify strategies that are substantially more complicated than standard strategies. Around 65% of teams using Always Defect to begin with, primarily out of safety concerns, with the remainder not considering the potential benefits of cooperating. Stage 1 cooperation rates are the same, or higher, in a comparable set of finitely repeated games, for both super-game 1 and the last common supergame. |
| Information | 英語での発表となります（Presentation in English） 主催：Empirical Micro Research Seminar 共催：Microeconomics Workshop |