| Title | Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure (joint with Salvatore Piccolo and Markus Reisinger) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2019年1月29日（火）January 29, 2019, 10:25-12:10 |
| Venue | 東京大学経済学研究科・学術交流棟（小島ホール）１階・第１セミナー室にて開催 [地図] Seminar Room No. 1, Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), University of Tokyo [MAP] |
| Speaker | Marco Pagnozzi (University of Naples Federico II) |
| Abstract | A manufacturer chooses the optimal retail market structure and bilaterally and secretly contracts with each (homogeneous) retailer. In a classic framework without asymmetric information, the manufacturer sells through a single exclusive retailer in order to eliminate the opportunism problem. When retailers are privately informed about their (common) marginal cost, however, the number of competing retailers also affects their information rents and the manufacturer may prefer an oligopolistic market structure. We characterize how the manufacturer’s production technology, the elasticity of final demand, and the size of the market affect the optimal number of retailers. Our results arise both with price and quantity competition, and also when realiers’ costs are imperfectly correlated. |
| Information | 英語での発表となります（Presentation in English） 主催：Microeconomics Workshop |