| Title | "Bidding and Drilling Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Payment Auctions" (joint with Andrey Ordin and James W. Roberts) |
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| Date | 2018年10月1日（月）10:30-12:00 |
| Venue | 東京大学経済学研究科・学術交流棟（小島ホール）１階・第１セミナー室にて開催 [地図] Seminar Room No. 1, Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), University of Tokyo [MAP] |
| Speaker | Vivek Bhattacharya (Northwestern University) |
| Abstract | Auctions are often used to sell assets whose future cash flows require the winner to make post-auction investments. When a winner’s payment is contingent on the asset’s cash flows, auction design can influence both bidding and incentives to exert effort after the auction. This paper proposes a model of contingent payment auctions that explicitly links auction design to post-auction economic activity, in the context of Permian Basin oil auctions. The estimated model is used to demonstrate that auction design can materially impact both revenue and post-auction drilling activity, as well as mitigate or amplify the effects of oil price shocks. |
| Information | 英語での発表となります（Presentation in English） 主催：ミクロ実証ワークショップ 共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ |