東京大学政策評価研究教育センター

CREPEDP-160

Number CREPEDP-160
Publication Date September 2024
Title "Incomplete Information and Investment Inaction"
Authors Jonathan Adams, Cheng Chen, Min Fang, Takahiro Hattori, and Eugenio Rojas
Abstract How do investment friction and information frictions interact? We study this question in a stylized continuous time model of heterogeneous firms facing incomplete information and irreversible investment. We analytically characterize how the information friction distorts firms’ decision rules and stationary distribution. The two frictions interact in rich and substantial ways. At the firm level, noisier information shrinks a firm’s inaction region and reduces the elasticity of investment to productivity. In the aggregate, it increases steady-state capital, increases capital misallocation, and attenuates the effect of productivity shocks on investment. Finally, we test and confirm these predictions using Japanese administrative data that match firms’ forecasts to their balance sheets, incomes, and expenditures.
Keywords Heterogeneous Firms, Incomplete Information, Irreversible Investment, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Misallocation, Investment Volatility
Other information Paper in English (58 pages)