

UN Security Council Elections as an Incentive for Compliance

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UN Security Council Elections as an Incentive for Compliance*

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Abstract

Standard economic theory would predict that costly demands placed by the United Nations on its members should be rewarded. Similarly, when rewards are not attractive enough, countries are not expected to comply with such demands. In this paper, we study whether the rewards offered by the United Nations are seats at the Security Council. We show empirically that countries that have greater demands placed upon them by Security Council resolutions are more likely to be elected. Furthermore, although countries comply with resolutions leading up to their election, compliance decreases after they are elected. Finally, we show that countries that have not been in the Security Council recently, and thus are due for election, have additional requests made of them.

Keywords: Civil War Resolutions; Self-Enforcing Agreements; Election Incentives

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1 Introduction

The main goal of the United Nations' (UN) Security Council (SC) is to promote international peace.¹ There are currently almost 100000 peacekeepers, who have been deployed among 14 different operations through Security Council resolutions. The Security Council has also authorized intervention such as the 1990 Gulf War. Since 1966, the Security Council has consisted of five permanent members (P5) and ten non-permanent members chosen by elections from regional groups.²

Every year, the SC votes on resolutions to address international conflict. According to the UN Charter, General Assembly (GA) resolutions are merely recommendations, while SC resolutions are meant to be binding.³ Thus, even though votes at the GA can be useful for estimating preferences and alliances, decisions made at the SC are a better way to study the degree of cooperation.⁴ Although there may be disagreement on whether SC resolutions fully accomplish its goals, there is no doubt that the UN has played a role in maintaining peace by deploying peacekeepers, calling for sanctions (i.e. embargos), and working as a mediator.

Enforcement of SC resolutions relies on the voluntary participation of member states, and thus these members must have an incentive to implement such resolutions.⁵ Theoretically, it is difficult to rationalize cooperation between nations with only sanctions; thus, some reward is needed. Models of

¹Although, as stated in the UN Charter, the SC's main goal is to promote peace, their agenda often goes beyond that task. For instance, the SC also discusses other topics such as criminal accountability, human rights, terrorism, etc. Existing literature discusses the importance of how heterogeneous topics can affect voting alignment among countries from year to year. See [Bailey et al. \(2017\)](#) for discussion of the importance of the difference between topics and [Dreher et al. \(2021\)](#) for an application.

²From its creation after WW2 up until 1965, the Security Council had only six non-permanent members in addition to the five veto holders: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

³Indeed, the only binding decision made at the GA is to elect the SC members.

⁴For example, [Bailey et al. \(2017\)](#) use GA votes for estimating preferences and alliances.

⁵Historically, most SC votes have been unanimous. The reason is not that the members agree with each other on all important international matters. Rather, it is because of the voting system at the Council: unless anyone abstains, resolutions must be approved by nine members including the five permanent members. If any of the fifteen members abstains, the thresholds are adjusted. Thus, the most divisive issues are not taken up, and the Council focuses instead on issues where a near consensus can be reached.

this form for international organizations (IOs) have been studied, where the reward is ‘voting power’ in an organization that decides whether to take actions that may favor its members ([Maggi and Morelli, 2006](#); [Caro-Burnett, 2020](#)).

There are potentially several different configurations to distribute voting power. [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) finds that in certain scenarios the best way to provide incentives to the members of an IO, say the UN, is to elect a subset of countries to a voting council. Rather than representing an aggregate of countries, the council is elected as a reward for engaging in costly demands imposed by the UN.⁶ Moreover, although it is true that the GA and SC are separate UN organs from a legally/institutional perspective, we argue that they may have an implicit understanding at least during SC elections. This is different from saying that the GA and SC, as entities, have the same preferences; indeed, both of them represent (in different ways) the preferences of all UN member nations. What we mean is that the mechanism that ensures countries’ engagement in costly demands dictates that the member nations use their votes (at the GA) to elect to the SC those members who should be rewarded.⁷ Indeed, supporting our argument, most of the elections to the SC are lightly contested or not contested at all. Moreover, countries that may seem like the ‘bad actors’ can access power, in certain years, to enforce some degree of cooperation from them.⁸ For example, in [Section 2](#), we discuss the 1993 election of Rwanda and the 2002 election of Angola, both of them being uncontested elections and following civil wars.

In this paper, we use econometric tools to test an unconventional interpretation of SC elections. Namely, we test whether there is an implicit game being played between the UN members, where

⁶See our discussion of [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) in [Section 3](#) and [appendix B](#).

⁷In other words, elections for SC seats would be merely nominal in the sense that the candidates are selected because they are supposed to win.

⁸This same principle would explain, for instance, why the UN also appoints countries who typically violate human rights to the Human Rights Council.

certain members have to occasionally be elected to the SC in order to enforce their cooperation.⁹ More specifically, we analyze empirically the dynamics between the key equilibrium variables that represent voting power, incentives, and rewards. Broadly speaking, the implicit game's equilibrium dictates that countries comply with resolutions, and after observing some evidence of compliance, the UN rewards some of those countries with SC seats. Moreover, we provide the first quantitative examination of compliance with UNSC resolutions. In addition, we examine the number of resolutions naming a particular country and the depth of the demands that are made upon each country. Our main empirical tools are conditional logit and ordinary least squares. Our main data set is the International Peace Institute's (IPI) compliance data on SC resolutions.

As our first result, we show that countries that have greater demands placed upon them are more likely to be elected to the SC, which is in line with theoretical predictions.¹⁰ We then move beyond those theoretical predictions, and show two more results that enhance and extend the existing stylized mathematical models. Our second and third results show that countries are less likely to comply with resolutions after having been elected, and there are more resolutions requesting cooperation in years when countries are due for election.

To address endogeneity, our identification strategy is an event study framework. The change in countries' behavior before and after their election to the SC (our second result) provides an important source of variation to justify the causal model that we based our hypothesis tests on. If, contrary to our assumptions, countries have demands placed upon them by the SC because they are the 'naturally cooperative' type of country, and they are then elected by the SC because they are this type of country,

⁹This interpretation is not a substitute to the results in the existing literature of the determinants of election, [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#), [Dreher et al. \(2014\)](#), and [Schmitz and Schwarze \(2012\)](#). Indeed, we complement and enrich those findings.

¹⁰Previous research has shown that there is a relationship between which members have been elected to the SC and what issues are taken up for consideration. See [Malone \(2000\)](#) for a qualitative discussion and [Maggi and Morelli \(2006\)](#); [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) for a game theory approach.

then we would not expect their behavior to change after their election. By looking at compliance with SC resolutions before and after election to the council, we show that, after election, countries that were previously cooperative shirk on their obligations.¹¹ Moreover, this phenomenon is not exclusive to the UN, as we can see similar shirking behavior in other IOs such as the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).¹²

On the other hand, the above discussion does not contradict [Voeten \(2014\)](#), who finds that joining the SC leads to becoming a more cooperative member of the organization. In that study, cooperation is understood (for the UN case) as peacekeeping contributions, which are factors not usually discussed explicitly in SC resolutions. In our study, cooperation is referred to compliance with resolutions, which are supposed to represent the decisions made at the core of the organization.

Our results extend the existing empirical literature on the SC. [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#), [Dreher et al. \(2014\)](#), and [Schmitz and Schwarze \(2012\)](#) analyze the determinants of SC elections. We pay particular attention to [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#)'s *turn-taking* variable, which indicates that the longer a country is not elected, the more likely it is to become a member of the SC. In our study, we combine the [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#) data with the data on SC resolutions from IPI and show that countries that have not been elected recently, and are thus 'due for election,' are likely to have additional demands placed upon them by the SC.

The remainder of the paper has the following structure: in Section 2, we provide brief concrete examples that are aligned with our theory and are within our period of analysis. In Section 3, we discuss the theoretical justification for our study. In Section 4 we discuss the data, and in Section 5 we show our results. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

¹¹To make our claim even stronger, even in the African region, where SC seats are decided based on turns ([Vreeland and Dreher, 2014](#), p. 116), our results still hold, as shown in Table A11.

¹²See [Noutcheva \(2009\)](#) and [Chow \(2013\)](#).

2 Anecdotal Motivation

Before we begin a formal analysis, we provide three examples that capture the behavior described in our model and belong to our sample, as they are related to civil war and happened during our period of analysis. In addition, we also provide evidence documented by Security Council Report (SCR), an independent organization that documents events related to the UN. Unfortunately, their oldest report regarding elections to the SC is from year 2006, which does not intersect our data.

Angola. The Angolan Civil War started in 1975 and lasted until 2002. The two major belligerents were the political parties Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The leader of MPLA, José Eduardo dos Santos, was elected president in 1979. His counterpart was, Jonas Savimbi, the leader and founder of UNITA. The UNSC had been increasingly bringing the Angolan Civil War onto their agenda, and imposing sanctions towards UNITA¹³ In early 2002, Savimbi died in combat against government troops; without proper leadership, UNITA signed a cease of fire in that same year.

A quick inspection of SC resolutions regarding Angola shows a contrast between the year 2002 and the years preceding it. For example, in 2001 there were three resolutions regarding Angola's civil war, all of them either 'reaffirming' or requesting actions from both the Angolan government and UNITA, none of them showing satisfaction with the Angolan government's compliance.¹⁴ In 2002, there were six resolutions regarding Angola. All of them 'welcoming' the achievements of the Angolan government. This contrast shows satisfaction from the UNSC with Angola's compliance managing their civil war in the year 2002. As a consequence, by the end of that same year, the elections for SC seats were held,

¹³SC Resolutions 864 (1993); 1127 (1997); and 1173 (1998). See [Angell \(2004\)](#).

¹⁴A typical resolution highlights the first word of each paragraph. This first word determines the tone of the paragraph, some examples are 'welcoming' to express satisfaction with the performance of a country; 'requesting' to express an action to be taken; 'reaffirming' to remind of a decision previously made at an older resolution. The three mentioned resolutions are the SC Resolutions 1336, 1348, and 1374, all in year 2001.

Angola was elected, and became a non-permanent member in 2003-2004.

Rwanda. Rwanda is ethnically divided into Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas. In the early 90's the state was controlled by Juvénal Habyarimana (a Hutu), from the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND) party. In 1990, the opposing party Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) representing the Tutsis started a civil war that lasted until 1993. The UNSC did not have a strong position regarding Rwanda during this civil war, as there are no resolutions mentioning Rwanda except for 1993. In that year, there are four resolutions regarding Rwanda.¹⁵ Moreover, two of those resolutions show some degree of satisfaction with the Rwandan government's compliance. By the end of that year, Rwanda was elected as a non-permanent SC member in 1994-1995.¹⁶ This example also relates to another one of our hypotheses; namely, a country that is due for election can expect to see a sudden increase in the number of resolutions.

Slovenia. The case of Slovenia is different from the previous two examples in two ways. First, Slovenia's election to the SC is due to a regional constraint, i.e. Eastern Europe hadn't had a former Yugoslav state representatives for several years. Second, Slovenia's neighbour countries had a poor compliance rate. Slovenia was elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council by the end of 1997, to serve in 1998 and 1999. In the years preceding its election, hardly any UN resolution mentions Slovenia. However, all other former Yugoslav states were mentioned in UN resolutions regarding conflicts.¹⁷ For instance, in 1997, there were several resolutions involving: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, as well as other neighbor countries. All of them were either reaffirming decisions made in previous years, or expressing concerns regarding the behavior of those countries. Only one of those resolutions (Res. 1093) has the word 'welcoming' being addressed to

¹⁵Resolutions 812, 846, 872, and 891.

¹⁶After signing the cease of fire, President Habyarimana was assassinated in 1994. This event lead to the Rwandan Genocide. See [Fenton \(2003\)](#). However, this event happened after the election of Rwanda to the SC.

¹⁷See [Manusama \(2007\)](#), chapter 2-section 3 and chapter 4-section 3.

member states. However, it is addressed to all former Yugoslav states as a group. This suggests that lack of a former Yugoslav state representative at the SC (since Yugoslavia's election at the end of 1987), plus the no compliance of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYR Macedonia, lead to the election of Slovenia.

Examples Documented by Security Council Report. The SCR reports on SC election and forecasts each year's election since 2006. They attribute several reasons for a country's election, such as resolution of internal conflict, resolution of or assistance with foreign conflicts, monetary contributions, and peacekeeping contributions.

According to SCR, the 2006 election of Indonesia as a member of the SC was at least partially explained by (i) Indonesia's efforts and support towards peace in regional conflicts in Southern Philippines and Cambodia, as well as (ii) the resolution of an internal conflict, with assistance from the international community, via the Aceh Peace Agreement. Similarly, in 2007, Libya and Croatia were two of the elected members. According to the SCR, the case of Libya could be explained by the termination of its nuclear program, and the resolution of conflicts in its neighbouring region, especially Chad and Darfur. Croatia may have been elected because it had never served on the SC before, since its UN membership in 1992; it participated in the Economic and Social Council; and it participated in eleven peacekeeping operations.

In 2008, some of the elected member to the SC were Austria, Japan and Turkey. Austria's strength of candidature was its participation in EU activities and emphasized its long engagement with international law, human rights, and disarmament. Austria contributed a total of 60,000 personnel in over fifty peacekeeping missions since 1960, with over 1400 Austrians serving in UN peacekeeping operations as of 2011. Japan was (at that moment) the second largest contributor to the UN regular budget and the peacekeeping budget after the US; Japan also provided civilians and Self Defence Forces to eight

peacekeeping operations. Finally, Japan improved the effectiveness of the Council working methods and peacekeeping during its chairmanship of the Security Council working groups in 2005-06. By virtue of its geographical location, Turkey emphasized the importance of dialogue for peace and security, and helped facilitate dialogue between Israel and Syria. Turkey was also involved in peacekeeping activities and has been actively involved in UN counter-terrorism initiatives.

One of the regions with the highest number of conflicts is the African continent. For example, in 2013, the SC resolution 2100 addressed the conflicts in Mali. In that resolution, the SC decided to establish the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In that same year, Chad contributed with 1252 peacekeepers to MINUSMA. According to SCR, this contribution was one of the reasons why they believed Chad was a strong candidate, and indeed Chad won the SC election of that year.

Similarly, in 2018, the SC addressed the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in resolutions 2424 and 2409. In resolution 2409, the SC strongly praised the efforts and achievements of the UN's Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). In that same year, the SCR correctly forecasted the election of South Africa due to its contributions of 1231 peacekeepers, of which 1185 were sent to DRC via MONUSCO.

3 Theoretical Motivation

Since the creation of the UN in 1945, IOs and international agreements have had an increasingly important role in the global decision making. They work on a variety of global issues such as preserving peace (UN), migration (International Organization for Migration, International Centre for Migration Policy Development), weapons control (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, In-

ternational Atomic Energy Agency), law enforcement (International Criminal Court), environment (agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement) and several other issues. There is no doubt that some IOs are very influential.

The UN is involved in a variety of issues besides peace. Some of the issues where the UN has shown a measurable degree of effectiveness are peacekeeping ([Moore, 1996](#)), imposing sanctions ([Biersteker et al., 2013](#)), advocating human rights ([Flood, 1998](#)), and even climate change ([Tompkins and Amundsen, 2008](#)).

Moreover, there is no doubt that the most important UN decisions are made at the SC. According to the UN Charter, the SC is the organ devoted to maintaining peace. The main tool that the SC uses to state its demands on international issues are its resolutions. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that the SC hopes that countries comply with the resolutions it passes. SC resolutions can authorize military actions such as the Gulf War ([UNSC, 1990](#)), impose sanctions on countries for unauthorized nuclear programs ([UNSC, 2009, 2011a](#)), and implement other actions such as the no-fly zone over Libya ([UNSC, 2011b](#)). Some related studies that focus on SC resolutions are [Benson and Kathman \(2014\)](#), [Beardsley and Schmidt \(2012\)](#), and [Gilligan and Stedman \(2003\)](#).

3.1 What do we know about elections to the SC?

Every year, representatives from each of five regions are elected for a two-year term to be part of the SC.¹⁸ Two thirds of the UN members must be in favor of a candidate to ensure election. However, there is no explicit rule stating which countries should be candidates or whether there are formal requirements for election.¹⁹

¹⁸The regions are African, Asia-Pacific, Eastern European, Latin American and Caribbean, and Western European and Others Group.

¹⁹That is, there is not an explicit threshold such as ‘the five countries with highest GDP per-capita growth’ or ‘compliance with this amount of costly demands’ that guarantees election.

The literature on the determinants of SC elections has shown that variables such as GDP and population have a statistically significant effect on the probability of election. [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#) have shown that a turn-taking variable also affects election. In this paper, we show that in addition to those variables, the cost of compliance, the degree of compliance, and the number of demands requested by the SC itself increase the probability of election. There has not been any previous empirical work on the relationship between resolutions and elections to the UNSC.²⁰

3.2 What do we know about compliance in IOs?

Although compliance with SC resolutions seems to have been overlooked, compliance with other IOs is a widely discussed topic in the international relations, political science, and law literature. Two of the most cited studies are [Chayes and Chayes \(1993\)](#) and [Downs et al. \(1996\)](#). [Chayes and Chayes \(1993\)](#) claim that compliance is in general good and enforcement may not be needed. In contrast, [Downs et al. \(1996\)](#) state that, although compliance is attained, the benefits and the cost of no enforcement are both small; therefore, they conclude that organizations do not fully commit to their cause.

Broadly speaking, some authors focus on the costs and benefits of being part of the IO (rationalism), while other authors focus on the institutional aspects (constructivism). A few of the studies that attempt to consolidate these two seemingly opposing ideas are [Checkel \(2001\)](#) and [Tallberg \(2002\)](#) for the EU, and [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) for the UNSC. [Checkel \(2001\)](#) focuses on persuasion and social learning to argue that rationalism and constructivism share similar elements. On the other hand, instead of finding a common ground, [Tallberg \(2002\)](#) argues that the best way to achieve compliance is a combination of enforcement and institutional design. The mathematical model in [Caro-Burnett](#)

²⁰Note that SC resolutions are meant to be compulsory, while GA resolutions are merely recommendations. Thus, we use SC resolutions for our study.

(2020) follows the same line of reasoning in combining these two elements. In [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#), there are costs and benefits to compliance, and the underlying mechanism that decides when the organization wishes to enforce actions is endogenous. Balance is achieved via an appropriate method of distributing decision-making power. This idea is related to [Abbott and Snidal \(1998\)](#), who argue that IOs play a role in the distribution of power and the enforcement of international laws.

Several authors have studied compliance in more specific contexts. For example, the IMF and the WB ([Dreher, 2004](#); [Edwards, 2005](#); [Rickard and Caraway, 2019](#)); compliance as a way to build reputation ([Simmons, 2000](#); [Downs and Jones, 2002](#)); international human rights ([Neumayer, 2005](#); [Hafner-Burton, 2005](#)); climate change ([Finus, 2008](#)); gender equality [Avdeyeva \(2010\)](#); and international trade [Büthe and Milner \(2008\)](#).

3.3 What do we know about compliance with SC resolutions?

In addition to [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#), we find that our results are generally in accordance with previous literature on SC resolutions. The three most closely related studies are [Gilligan and Stedman \(2003\)](#); [Beardsley and Schmidt \(2012\)](#); [Benson and Kathman \(2014\)](#).

[Benson and Kathman \(2014\)](#) define UN resolutions as ‘biased’ when a resolution explicitly mentions one of the parties in a conflict, and find that troop commitment by the UN is positively correlated with this measure of bias. However, this definition of bias is somewhat unusual. For instance, if a party is obviously the ‘bad actor’ it will be mentioned more in resolutions, but using a conventional definition of the term we would not conclude from this that the UN is biased against that party. Our analysis examines compliance of countries with resolutions in such a way that there is no need to explicitly define any bias, thereby avoiding the problem of deciding on a suitable definition.

Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) use a database from The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions project to code a dummy indicating UN Resolutions' alignment with the preferences of the P5. They find that UN Resolutions present no bias towards interests of P5. This result is rather surprising since, theoretically, the voting mechanism as described in the UN charter implicitly dictates that resolutions passed will represent the interests of the fifteen SC members, which includes the P5 (who in addition have veto power). In addition, the P5 usually have conflicted interests among them. For instance, the idea of how different preferences among the P5 affects the outcomes is studied in Voeten (2001). In our study, we find an analogous result for the case of the non-permanent members of the SC. Namely, by considering a much larger data set, we show that the number of resolutions being addressed towards a country is uncorrelated with being part of the SC.²¹

Gilligan and Stedman (2003) show that the number of deaths in battle increases the peacekeeping forces sent by the UN. Somewhat surprisingly, they find a negative regional effect for Asia and no significant regional effect for the Middle East. By considering resolutions rather than yearly battle deaths, we have a larger data set and thus can include additional explanatory variables. In particular, we separate the effects of Africa from the Middle East. We find an analogous result: the number of resolutions addressed to a country increases with the number of deaths in battle.²²

The three studies just discussed take an optimistic approach: while countries analyze the costs and benefits of compliance in making their decision, they assume that nations 'play by the rules.' One could possibly study more cynical equilibria influencing the outcomes of election in the SC. Reinsberg (2019) argues that countries interested in joining the SC are more likely to increase foreign aid during their campaign. Although the subset of such countries is relatively small, providing aid is a variable

²¹See Table 9.

²²Moreover, after adding religion dummy-variables, we find that, as one would expect, Africa (not Asia) receives less attention from the UN. The African result comes from Column (5) in Table 9. For brevity, the regional effects were omitted. They are available upon request.

that we did not include in our study. Similarly, [Kuziemko and Werker \(2006\)](#) shows how some elected states receive larger foreign aid; nevertheless, they provide an additional reason to why countries want to join the SC, thus enhancing our hypothesis for compliance.

Further afield, [Mikulaschek \(2018\)](#) shows that the European Union members receive additional funds while they hold a seat at the SC, which again also enhances our hypothesis. [Lai and Lefler \(2017\)](#) show that countries elected to the SC do not vote in accordance to their region's preferences; and thus, they do not behave as real regional representatives. Their result does not weaken ours, indeed both stories are compatible. Countries want a seat at the SC for selfish reasons, and thus the UN uses those selfish motivations as rewards in order to attain good behavior. However, good behavior in our language means compliance: it has nothing to do with being a good representative of neighbouring countries.

3.4 Our Theoretical Contribution

Our study is inspired by the mechanism design literature that simultaneously addresses two lines of thought in the international relations theory: selfish agents (nations) measure costs and benefits and, at the same time, a principal (organization) that chooses the right institutions to achieve some goal. Some studies that fall in this category are [Fearon \(1998\)](#); [Maggi and Morelli \(2006\)](#); [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#).

We pay special attention to [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) who studies the specific case of the UNSC. Broadly speaking, the author proposes that an organization (the UN) wants to find the best possible mechanism (decision-making rule) that ensures the participation of its members. The mathematical model shows that, in cases resembling the UN configuration, the best mechanism mimics an endogenously

determined voting council such that: (i) the council is chosen based on which countries are in favor or against taking a certain action, (ii) the council's decision matches the action that the organization finds optimal, and (iii) based on the costs of compliance and the prospects of future cooperation (the benefits), all countries follow the action prescribed by the council. Further details are described in appendix B.

If we map this model to the UN, one implication is that in any given year, the members of the UN already know which countries should be elected to the SC for the following year, and thus elections for SC non-permanent members are nominal. This is because by giving voting power to certain nations it is possible to ensure their participation in actions that they would otherwise reject. Thus, our first testable implication is that countries that have been subject to costly demands by the UN are more likely to be elected to the SC. In addition, we further extend this first testable hypothesis by adding two ideas. First, the cost of a demand is only meaningful whenever the country actually complies with the resolution. Second, clearly the number of demands also affects the total cost of compliance. Therefore, our first testable model for election would include measures of the difficulty of the demands, compliance, and the number of demands.

Caro-Burnett (2020)'s baseline model analyzes the case when compliance is perfectly observable; however, in reality compliance is imperfectly observable.²³ That study has a discussion on imperfect monitoring, i.e. how observable 'signals' of compliance can be used to construct an equilibrium. The conjecture in Caro-Burnett (2020) is that signals of 'high' compliance are rewarded with voting power. We already discussed the idea of SC election as a reward; however, we can extend the theory by hypothesizing what would happen after a country is elected. The SC's two-year terms are not

²³Because either the variable itself cannot be perfectly measured, or the fact that the 'intentions to comply' are also affected by external factors.


revocable, immediate reelection is not allowed, and demands are costly to comply with. There is thus no immediate benefit for an already-elected country to comply with the demands in an SC resolution. Our second hypothesis is thus that elected countries will begin shirking on their obligations immediately after elections. On the other hand, countries that lost the election still have a chance to be rewarded in the near future; these countries are thus less likely to shirk.

Moreover, this second test also provides a justification for the direction of the causality that links compliance and elections. That is, a possible issue with the testable model is that some countries are simply ‘nice’ in the sense that they comply regardless of any (implicitly) promised reward. One way for checking whether this is the case is by looking at post-election compliance, which is exactly our second hypothesis. Fortunately, IPI’s data set on compliance is rich enough to allow us to make a distinction between before-election and after-election compliance with resolutions.²⁴

Finally, our third hypothesis regards countries not elected, which lies beyond the theoretical scope of any of the mentioned studies. We claim that the UN may put ‘on trial’ countries that expect to be elected in the near future. The most natural way to measure this is by looking at the number of resolutions placed upon a country. Moreover, following [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#), a good measure for a country to be ‘due for election’ is the rotation-norm, which, broadly speaking, is the number of years not in power divided by the number of candidates of a region. Thus we would expect that the UN would increase the number of resolutions to countries that have not been part of the SC for a longer time. Figure 1 summarizes our three testable hypotheses, and how they are mutually related.

²⁴See Section 5.2.

Figure 1: Testable Hypotheses



4 Data

The main data set has information on civil war resolutions, and it was coded at the resolution level by the IPI. The second data set has data on conflicts at the country level, and it was coded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo (UCDP-PRIO). Finally, the third data set contains political and economical data, including the mentioned rotation-norm (which was coded by [Vreeland and Dreher, 2014](#)), as well as bilateral foreign debt. We describe the details below.

4.1 Resolutions

IPI coded data of civil war resolutions between 1989 and 2003.²⁵ During these fifteen years, the SC voted on 895 resolutions, from which 306 were classified as civil war resolutions by the IPI. In this data set, there are 172 country-year pairs (omitting resolutions that are addressed to ‘everybody’). Moreover, in this period, 75 countries were elected to the SC, and four of them were explicitly targeted

²⁵Other periods and other resolutions were not coded by IPI.

by UN resolutions on civil war.²⁶ Although in principle this number may seem low, we note that the average number of country members by group is 37.5; and also on average, only one is elected per region-year pair. Thus, the unconditional probability of election of a country is 2.67%. On the other hand, the ratio of countries mentioned in civil war resolutions and were elected to total elected members is 5.33%.

For each resolution, expert coders classified the depth of demand that a resolution made on a targeted country on a scale of one to three. Then, they classified the degree to which a country complied with this demand in the short term (six months) and in the medium term (twelve months). Compliance was measured on a scale of one to four. Table 1 shows a list of the variables used.²⁷

The three variables relevant to our study are: Depth of Demand, Short Term Compliance, and Medium Term Compliance. Depth of Demand captures the difficulty of the request imposed by the UN on the party addressed. According to the IPI's coding manual, *"the greatly varying degree of a demand's intrusiveness explains why the costs associated with compliance with some demands create high incentives for non-compliance while compliance with others does not raise any significant costs."* This illustrates how the coding method directly captures the extent of the demands' cost for a country. Therefore, the probability of being elected should be higher when more difficult demands are being imposed to a country. The Depth of Demand was coded in three levels: low, medium and high.

Compliance with the low Depth of Demand *"does not put the survival of the addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk."* Compliance with medium level

²⁶Besides IPI data on civil war, there is no data on compliance with other SC resolutions.

²⁷An anonymous referee pointed out to us that, at IPI's data, each compliance is averaged over all participants involved on a civil war, which includes the opposing party. This does not seem to be a problem for our regressions. Indeed, at the end of the day, it is in the government's best interest to find a 'local agreement' with all the parties in order to achieve some desired level of compliance. This implies some compromise and thus a costly action, which is what our theory is modeling. In addition, some resolutions are based on previously 'unfulfilled' resolutions by the same countries being addressed. This is not an issue either, since all that matters to justify our theory is a costly action that the organization wants to take.

“makes it significantly more difficult for the demand addressee to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath.” Finally, compliance with the high level *“puts the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk.”* Note that while compliance with demands of low and medium level seems plausible, the high level Depth of Demand seems excessive and not many parties would be willing to fully comply.²⁸

The other two variables from IPI’s data set that are relevant to our study are the Short and Medium Term Compliance. The assessment of compliance was done independently by two coders, and then the final score was reconciled using their source material. According to the IPI’s coding manual, the assessment of compliance *“is based on personal judgment.... the best way to do so is to base all assessments on primary and secondary sources, and to document what these documents tell us about compliance. Therefore we (IPI) have documented the sources that formed the basis of our coding decisions on the compliance variables.”* Compliance was measured in four levels: non or low compliance; medium to low compliance; medium to high compliance; and full or almost full compliance. Finally, the Short Term Compliance is measured based on evidence found six months after the adoption of a resolution; while Medium Term Compliance is measured using evidence found twelve months after the adoption of a resolution. In addition, we coded a few more dummy variables at the resolution level to help us categorize the data.

Table 2 describes some additional variables we have generated for our analysis in order to summarize the data on compliance at the country level. First, we want to measure the maximum depth of demand imposed to each country. There are several countries that only have small requests and other countries have strong requests placed upon them. We believe that for countries in the later group, small requests

²⁸This suggests that perhaps the UN does not expect compliance on high Depth of Demand resolutions; and therefore the medium level are the resolutions that are relevant to be considered for rewards. We can see this effect on Table 6, where only the compliance to level 2 of Depth of Demand is significant.

Table 1: List of Variables from the International Peace Institute (data at the Security-Council-resolution by country level)

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
Depth of Demand	Measure of the difficulty of the request from the UN to a specific country on a specific resolution. Measured from 1 to 3.	2.06	0.72	
Short Term Compliance	Compliance of a specific country on a specific resolution. Measured from 1 to 4, within six months after the resolution was passed.	1.95	0.93	
Medium Term Compliance	Compliance of a specific country on a specific resolution. Measured from 1 to 4, within twelve months after the resolution was passed.	2.00	0.86	
Depth 1	Dummy indicating whether a resolution had a Depth of Demand equal to 1.	0.23	0.42	572
Depth 2	Dummy indicating whether a resolution had a Depth of Demand equal to 2.	0.47	0.49	1160
Short Term Compliance 1	Dummy for whether the compliance of the resolution was of level 1.	0.37	0.48	928
Short Term Compliance 2	Dummy for whether the compliance of the resolution was of level 2.	0.37	0.48	919
Short Term Compliance 3	Dummy for whether the compliance of the resolution was of level 3.	0.16	0.37	409

The five dummy variables were coded by the authors. We include them in this list (and not in Table 2) because they required only minor computation. Data is available for a total of 2465 resolution-country pairs. We consider only the countries named in the resolutions, and ignore non-state parties. There are no missing values.

may not be relevant.²⁹ Thus, their yearly maximum depth of demand for those countries is necessarily a number between one and three, for countries involved in a civil war.³⁰

Since our main results are analyzed at the country level, we need to map the IPI data (coded at the resolution level) to the rest of our data. Of course, it is mathematically logical to ‘extend’ the difficulty of a request to all countries, by setting the depth of demand equal to zero. That is, we believe that it makes sense that no requests is interpreted as a zero-difficulty request. On the other hand, the same extension cannot be applied to compliance, since the absence of data on compliance does not have any clear interpretation. Because of this issue, we decided to extend compliance in a different way. We averaged the compliance to resolutions by country by year at each of the three levels of the depth of demand.³¹ Finally, we computed the interaction of the number of resolutions to each level of depth of demand times the average compliance to resolutions of that same depth of demand, and label that as the total cost of (resolutions of) depth n , for $n = 1, 2, 3$.

²⁹We use this approach, instead of calculating a simple mean of all of the depths of demand, because in the case that a more serious demand is placed on a country, the number of minor demands is irrelevant, and thus taking a mean is inappropriate. It also does not matter if we include a separate dummy variable for countries that have no demands placed upon them.

³⁰Here it is important to point out that several countries were not involved in any civil war. Indeed, in our data set, only 34 UN members have been requested to comply on a resolution, and the average number of requests per country per year is 4.83.

³¹Additionally, we also use a selection model à la Heckman that predicts which countries are likely to have requests placed upon them. See Appendix Table A7.

Table 2: List of Variables Coded by the Authors (coded at the country-year level)

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
Max Depth of Demand	The maximum depth of demand across all demands within a country-year pair. Countries with no demands placed were assigned a zero. Otherwise, this variable ranges from 1 to 3.	2637	0.18	0.69	
Ave. Comp. resolutions Depth 1	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year, only of those resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 1.	172	1.74	1.34	
Ave. Comp. resolutions Depth 2	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year, only of those resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 2.	172	1.90	0.77	
Ave. Comp. resolutions Depth 3	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year, only of those resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 3.	172	1.40	0.93	
Number of resolutions Depth 1	Number of resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 1.	2637	0.20	1.29	
Number of resolutions Depth 2	Number of resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 2.	2637	0.40	2.12	
Number of resolutions Depth 3	Number of resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 3.	2637	0.26	1.44	
Sum Comp Depth 1	Total Cost of compliance Depth 1 = Number of resolutions Depth 1 × Ave. Short Term Compliance 1.	172	6.94	9.22	
Sum Comp Depth 2	Total Cost of compliance Depth 2 = Number of resolutions Depth 2 × Ave. Short Term Compliance 2.	172	12.06	10.99	
Sum Comp Depth 3	Total Cost of compliance Depth 3 = Number of resolutions Depth 3 × Ave. Short Term Compliance 3.	172	6.95	7.16	
Average Short Term Compliance	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year for all levels of depth of demand.	172	2.09	0.64	
Average Medium Term Compliance	We averaged the level of Medium Term Compliance by country and year for all levels of depth of demand.	172	2.12	0.62	
Change in Compliance	The difference between Average Medium Term Compliance and Average Short Term Compliance.	172	0.03	0.35	
Log number of Resolutions Elected	Log (number of resolutions + 1)	2637	0.15	0.61	
Eligible	Dummy indicating whether a country was elected at the Security Council Elections in year t , to become a member in year $t + 1$.	2637	0.03	0.17	75
Any Resolution	Following the UN Charter, a country is eligible if it is not a current SC member and was not a member on the previous year.	2637	0.94	0.23	2487
	Dummy indicating whether a country was mentioned in any resolution in that year.	2637	0.07	0.25	172

Data is available for a total of 2637 country-year pairs. Of these, 172 pairs correspond to country years where there is a resolution. For the pairs where there is no resolution, we code the Depth of Demand as zero, and treat compliance data as missing.

4.2 Additional Civil War Data

We used data from the UCDP-PRIO, which coded several data sets related to civil war. As shown in Table 3, we use three variables from this data set: a dummy indicating whether a country has had a purely internal conflict in a year (*Civ War No-Int*); a dummy indicating whether a country has a civil war with international conflicts (*Civ War Int*); and the number of battle deaths.

Table 3: List of Variables from UCDP-PRIO (at the country-year level)

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
<i>Civ War No-Int</i>	Dummy for having a civil war without international consequences, by country and year.	2637	0.019	0.139	52
<i>Civ War Int</i>	Dummy for having a civil war with international consequences, by country and year.	2637	0.153	0.360	404
<i>Log Battle Deaths</i>	Log (Battle Deaths on Civil Wars +1)	2637	0.92	2.148	

The data is available for a total of 2637 country-year pairs. Variables *Civ War NO-Int* and *Civ War Int* are not meant to be mutually exclusive. However, in the data, only four observations have both categories: one purely internal and the other with international consequences.

4.3 Relevant Covariates

We use data from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#) as additional covariates for our study. We divide their variables in three sets, as displayed in Table 4. The variables labeled as ‘main’ are variables that were the focus of their regressions. The variables labeled as ‘political’ are the ones we believe measure ideology. Finally, the third group ‘others’ are variables capturing language, religion, and alliances. From their data, we pay special attention to the Rotation Norm that captures how long a country has not been part of the SC (relative to its region), and this is due for election.

Table 4: List of Variables from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#) (at the country-year level)

	Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
Main	Log Area	Log (Total territory)	2637	11.34	2.63	
	Log GNI/pc	Log (GNI per capital)	2637	7.45	1.56	
	Log Pop	Log (Population)	2637	15.30	2.06	
	Rotation Norm	Number of years since last election/Number of members in regional group	2424	0.94	0.84	
Political	Democracy	Dummy for Democracy	2621	0.54	0.50	1405
	Inlinerus2	Share of votes inline with Russia at the UNGA	2624	0.55	0.15	
	Inlineusa2	Share of votes inline with the US at the UNGA	2624	0.16	0.10	
	IMF	Dummy for participating on a IMF program	2621	0.36	0.48	933
	Lunpkave	Log (Monthly average peace keeping troops)	2622	1.68	2.49	
	Lusaid	Log (US development aid +1)	2637	12.04	7.51	
	Lusmilaid	Log (US military assistance +1)	2637	8.64	6.93	
	Pariah	Dummy for countries subject to sanctions	2637	0.06	0.23	146
Others	WB	Number of Work Bank projects started	2637	1.49	2.25	
	Arab	Dummy for Arab	2637	0.03	0.17	74
	Britcol	Dummy for former British Colony	2626	0.30	0.46	799
	Francecol	Dummy for former French Colony	2637	0.10	0.30	255
	EU	Dummy for European Union	2637	0.07	0.25	174
	G77andnam	Dummy for G77 and NAM	2637	0.62	0.49	1622
	G77notnam	Dummy for G77 and no NAM	2637	0.10	0.30	267
	Namnotg77	Dummy for NAM and not G77	2637	0.02	0.15	
	Ideolshare	Proportion of the largest share among chief executives	2389	0.20	0.20	
	Corrupt	Measure of Corruption	2436	-0.05	0.99	
	Muslim	Share of muslims	2622	0.25	0.37	
	Cath	Share of catholics	2622	0.34	0.36	
	NATO	Dummy for NATO	2624	0.08	0.27	207
	OIC	Dummy for OIC	2637	0.29	0.45	760
	Juscanz	Dummy for Juscanz	2637	0.07	0.25	172

Finally, in addition to covariates from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#), we want to control for the possibility that countries may change their usual behavior after election, due to influence from powerful nations. To do so, we collected data on received bilateral aid. Thus, we use the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) data from France, Germany, Japan, US and UK.³² Table 5 below summarizes the non-zero observations from 1989 to 2003 for recipient countries belonging to the UN.

Table 5: Foreign (received) Aid to UN members, from 1989 to 2003

Variable	Non-zero Obs	Mean	SD
Aid France	2,123	44.34	290.54
Aid Germany	2,147	77.79	290.29
Aid Japan	2,030	40.96	231.35
Aid UK	1,960	258.13	984.58
Aid US	2,163	105.33	606.28

Variables are expressed in millions USD. We restrict attention to the years and countries of our analysis. Source: OECD-data.

5 Results

5.1 Elections and Costly Compliance

First, we will explore how costly compliance with UN resolutions is related with elections for seats at the SC. We want to predict which countries are elected in each region. If we were only considering one region, exactly one country was elected each time, and the same countries were eligible each period, then our data could be analyzed using a standard logit model. In the data we have, however,

³²[OECD \(2014\)](#). Although there are observations from Russia in this dataset, the recipient countries and the periods do not match our sample. Unfortunately, there is no available data on received bilateral aid coming from China from the OECD-ODA. Although other sources have data on commitments to aid (including China), even commitment data from China does not perfectly match our years of analysis. In addition, we think actual observed aid is a more appropriate measure to control for influence.

there are multiple heterogeneous regions, zero or multiple countries elected from different regions, and some countries are ineligible in some periods. We will thus use a conditional logistic model following [McFadden \(1973\)](#). Moreover, we will make modifications to our data such that it fits the requirements for that method.

An election for a single region in a single year, will be a ‘single choice’ in the framework of [McFadden \(1973\)](#). In the West-Europe region, two members are elected every second year; and in Africa, two members are elected for even years and one member is elected for odd years. Elections where multiple members are chosen, do not fit directly into the desired choice framework. In these cases, we duplicate some data in the following way: in an election where countries c and c' are elected, we replace this election with two separate elections. One containing country c and all the other non-elected countries, the other containing c' and all the other non-elected countries. The first of these two elections shows that country c is preferred over all the other countries, except possibly for c' . The second of these two elections shows that country c' is preferred over all the other countries, except possibly for c .³³ The result is a total of 75 independent elections in our modified data. In each of these elections, countries that served in the SC the previous year are ineligible for election, we thus eliminate them from the set of choices.³⁴

We are interested in how demands that the SC has previously made to countries and their compliance

³³[Dreher et al. \(2014\)](#) used a sequential approach, based on [Manski and Sherman \(1980\)](#), but with some small modifications. [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#) and [Dreher et al. \(2014\)](#) use a Maximum Likelihood estimator that takes into account that when two countries are elected in one region-year election, one of them is necessarily preferable to the other. This sophisticated method is complex to implement and may require writing a bespoke estimation routine. Our simplified method, on the other hand, is implementable using off-the-shelf routines from standard statistics software such as Stata. We use the fact that if there are two elected nations, each one of them is more preferred than the non-elected ones. Implicitly, we ignore any preference between the two winners of an election. We have estimated [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#)’s results with our simplified method and the point estimates given by our method are extremely close to the original estimates, and much closer than those from other methods, such as a straightforward logit model (these comparisons are available from the authors upon request). As an additional check, in appendix Table [A4](#), we use the rank-ordered logit model to allow for a choice model with two choices. In that table, we see that this approach gives nearly identical results.

³⁴As stated by the UN Charter.

may influence the election in the following council. If a country c , with attributes X is in choice group $B = (R, t)$, where R is a region and t is a period; then, the probability of its election is defined as follows:

$$P(c|X, B) = \frac{e^{V(X, c, \hat{c})}}{e^{\sum_{c' \in R} V(X, c', \hat{c})}} \quad (1)$$

where \hat{c} is any ‘benchmark’ country of that region. Following [McFadden \(1973\)](#), the function $V(\cdot)$, is assumed to be linearly separable: $V(X, c, \hat{c}) = v(X, c) - v(X, \hat{c})$. Moreover, the ‘utility indicator’ function $v(\cdot)$ is assumed to be linear. Thus, considering a single election on a single choice set $B = (R, t)$:

$$\begin{aligned} v(X, c) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Depth_c + \beta_2 ResolutionsNumber_c + \beta_3 Compliance_c \\ & + \beta_4 (ResolutionsNumber_c \times Compliance_c) + \gamma Controls_c \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where the previous equation omits the subscripts for region R and period t , $Depth_c$ is the max depth of demand made by SC resolutions directed to that country, $ResolutionsNumber_c$ is the number of resolutions directed to that country, and $Compliance_c$ is the average compliance directed at that country. Finally, $Controls_c$ are a set of 29 control variables as used in [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#).

Finally, let us recall that not all countries have demands placed on them, thus extending the depth of demands and compliance needs to be carefully done. As explained in Section 4, setting $Depth_c = 0$ for such countries is correct. However, the same cannot be done to $Compliance_c$. Instead, we use the disaggregated compliance to resolutions for each of the 3 levels of depth of demands.

Table 6: SC Elections from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Elected				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Max Depth of Demand	2.433*	2.455*	2.786**	2.938**	3.910*
	(1.005)	(1.015)	(1.062)	(1.121)	(1.699)
Number of resolutions Depth 1	0.309	0.306	0.416	0.676	0.642
	(0.976)	(1.004)	(1.160)	(1.239)	(1.500)
Number of resolutions Depth 2	-1.003	-1.048	-1.091	-1.077	-1.293
	(0.803)	(0.786)	(0.816)	(0.821)	(0.882)
Number of resolutions Depth 3	-1.332	-1.387	-1.569	-1.649	-2.435
	(0.877)	(0.893)	(0.966)	(1.013)	(1.524)
Average Compliance Depth 1	-0.139	-0.185	0.00604	0.228	0.258
	(0.651)	(0.664)	(0.746)	(0.849)	(0.929)
Average Compliance Depth 2	-2.373*	-2.454*	-2.647*	-2.800*	-3.947#
	(1.206)	(1.231)	(1.289)	(1.343)	(2.065)
Average Compliance Depth 3	-4.387#	-4.350#	-4.542#	-4.733#	-6.364#
	(2.262)	(2.244)	(2.393)	(2.534)	(3.773)
Sum Comp Depth 1	-0.241	-0.244	-0.358	-0.518	-0.685
	(0.538)	(0.552)	(0.688)	(0.785)	(1.011)
Sum Comp Depth 2	0.733#	0.771#	0.826#	0.833#	1.084#
	(0.427)	(0.430)	(0.437)	(0.446)	(0.584)
Sum Comp Depth 3	0.657	0.667	0.725	0.777	1.145
	(0.472)	(0.476)	(0.522)	(0.548)	(0.801)
Civ War No-Int		-0.457	-0.0533	0.356	0.793
		(1.213)	(1.265)	(1.340)	(1.277)
Civ War Int		0.241	-0.0322	0.150	0.290
		(0.339)	(0.372)	(0.397)	(0.427)
Rotation Norm			0.122	0.323	0.437#
			(0.203)	(0.216)	(0.238)
Log GNI/pc			0.541***	0.587***	0.716**
			(0.122)	(0.164)	(0.228)
Log Population			0.598***	0.534***	0.617***
			(0.123)	(0.142)	(0.179)
Log Area			-0.0727	-0.0964	-0.175
			(0.0941)	(0.0983)	(0.128)
Observations	2,688	2,688	2,585	2,541	2,099
War Data	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	No	Yes

Conditional (fixed effects) logistic estimation at the country level, for each UN region and and year. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Column (1) has all possible observations. However, the panel is still imbalanced since the number of eligible countries changes through time. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#), and not all observations are available.

Table 6 shows that the coefficient of the Max Depth of Demand is positive, which indicates that countries that were asked to perform a more serious demand are more likely to be elected to the SC.³⁵ Columns (2) to (5) show that the result is robust to the introduction of additional covariates.³⁶

There are two difficulties to interpret the coefficients. First, the coefficients come from the log odds ratio expression in equation (1); thus, it can be seen as the partial effect of, say, $Depth_c$ on the log odds ratio. The second problem is that, even if we are content with that interpretation, we still cannot know the exact value because the fixed effects are not estimated.

Luckily, there is a way to interpret the coefficients. We use the semi-elasticities approach: the percent change of the dependent variable (probability of election) as a result of a change of the independent variable, say, $Depth_c$. The coefficients for using this method are displayed in the appendix Table A5.³⁷ For instance, in Column (5) of that table, the semi-elasticity of the election with respect to the Max Depth of Demand is 3.789, indicating that if the UN were to increase the difficulty of its demands towards a country, that country would increase its probability of election by 378.9%, or almost 3.8 times higher.

To give a more precise example, let us analyze the African region, which is probably the closest to homogeneous. Indeed, let us assume that all African countries are identical at zero depth of demand. Thus, under our simplifying assumptions and $Depth_c = 0$, the probability of election on an even year would be 2%.³⁸ Angola was elected to the SC in 2002, with an Max Depth of Demand of 3. Under all our simplifying assumptions, roughly speaking, by being requested costly demands from the SC, the

³⁵Replacing our Depth of Demand coding with a simple dummy variable equal to one if any resolution making a demand to that country was passed, does not substantially change the results.

³⁶A potential issue, that is related to our econometric specification, could be that some years have highly competitive elections. Appendix Table A6 shows that distinguishing years and regions with competitive elections does not provide any additional predictive power compared to Table 6.

³⁷See Kitazawa (2012) for details on the methodology.

³⁸There are 50 eligible countries and one available seat, since from all 53 African countries, two are already on the council and one is ineligible as it is just leaving.

probability of election of Angola increased from 2% to 22.73%.³⁹

The coefficients for Average Compliance of Depth 2 and 3 are negative and statistically significant (generally at the 5% and 10% level, respectively); however, their interpretation is not relevant since the total cost of compliance is the product of the number of resolutions being requested times the average compliance. To see this, let us recall that countries with no civil war demands of depth k placed on them were coded as having zero compliance of that level; and we later corrected this by using civil war dummy variables. Then, since countries with no civil war have zero compliance of depth k , the negative association between elections and average compliance captures the magnitude of the conflict. A country with a more severe conflict is going to have some compliance of depth level 3, but countries with mild conflicts or no conflicts at all are going to have zero compliance of that same level.⁴⁰

More importantly, the coefficient for Sum Comp Depth 2 (the product of Average Compliance Depth 2 and Number of Resolutions Depth 2) is positive and statistically significant (at 10%). In contrast, the point estimate for Sum Comp Depth 1 is statistically insignificant and smaller in magnitude. We thus see that resolutions of depth 1 are too mild to be rewarded. Instead, resolutions of depth 2, which are moderately costly are the ones used for future rewarding. The Average Compliance Depth 2 variable captures, broadly speaking, countries with moderate conflict; and the interaction term captures that countries who are addressed with more resolutions of this depth and comply are more likely to be elected.⁴¹

³⁹ $3 \times 3.789 \times 2\%$.

⁴⁰Note that this way of coding plays the opposite role on Max Depth of Demand.

⁴¹Unfortunately, the interaction term for compliance with Depth 3 resolutions is difficult to interpret because it has a point estimate for the coefficient that is similar to the Depth 2 estimate but it is not statistically significant. Thus, we do not know whether Depth 3 resolutions behave in the same way as Depth 2 resolutions, or whether they are too costly, and thus, not expected to be complied with (e.g. perhaps the UN uses these resolutions only for media coverage as a signal that a serious issue is “being discussed and addressed” and the UN does not really expect the country to fully comply).

5.2 Compliance after Elections

In Table 6, we analyzed how the probability of being elected at the SC depends on the demands made upon a country and the cost to comply with them. This leads to a subsequent question: how do countries comply after election?

In our data, compliance is measured six months (short term) and twelve months (medium term) after each resolution. While SC elections occur near the end of the year, SC Resolutions are passed throughout the year.⁴² Thus, in most cases, the short term compliance for a resolution will be observed before the election. Let us first consider the month of April. For a resolution approved in that month, short term compliance would be measured, and thus observed, around October of the same year. On the other hand, compliance beyond the short term is unknown. If we are interested in how being elected to the SC affects compliance with resolutions, we are mainly interested in compliance beyond the short term. Our dependent variable will thus be medium term compliance, and we will include short term compliance as a control variable in the regression. Now, let us consider the rest of the sample. For resolution passed in the months after April, the medium term compliance is also measured after elections. This includes 74.35% of the resolutions on our sample. Moreover, while short term compliance to resolutions passed between January and March has been fully observed by the time of elections, medium term compliance has not been fully observed by UN members; therefore, it is still valid to put medium term compliance on the left hand side of the equation.⁴³ Our estimating equation based on the data set of UN resolutions on a given year t will be:

⁴²Although in recent years, elections have been scheduled to the middle of the year, they happen at the end of the year in our sample. See Table A3 in the Appendix.

⁴³Compliance builds up as the sum a series of actions of all parties involved, and the measured compliance in the data are just the observations of that sum at months six and twelve. Thus, even for the month of January, potentially most problematic case, there are three months of uncertainty between elections in October and the measurement of medium term compliance in January of next year. In addition, dropping the first three months of resolutions does not change our results.

$$MidTermComp_{c,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Elected_{c,t} + \beta_2 + \gamma Controls_{c,t} \quad (3)$$

where for a given year t and a country c , $MidTermComp_{c,t}$ is the average medium term compliance, $Elected_{c,t}$ indicates whether the country was elected in that year (to serve at the Security Council in periods $t + 1$ and $t + 2$). $Controls_{c,t}$ includes whether the country is already part of the Security Council; Short Term Compliance; the Max Depth of Demand; the rotation norm; foreign aid from powerful nations; and a series of covariates as used in [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#).⁴⁴ All variables are in period t , since it is the most relevant information used at the moment of election.

In addition, there is potentially endogeneity of foreign aid. Although we use this variable as a control, it is also important to address this issue, especially because this second regression is our approach to claim causality given the available data. Since we use bilateral aid from different countries, we use instruments for foreign aid for the donors and for the recipients. [Budjan and Fuchs \(2021\)](#) use measures of democracy as an instrument for the donor. [Galiani et al. \(2017\)](#) use lagged GDP per capita thresholds as an instrument for the recipient, since our years of observation is smaller, that threshold is not a strong predictor in this model, so we use lagged GNI per capita, population and a country's territory size instead.⁴⁵

Column (1) of Table 7 shows that our main result regarding election is not being driven by foreign aid. Column (2) includes foreign aid as a control variable, without instrumenting. Columns (3)-(6) instrument foreign aid, and the estimated coefficient for election becomes 50% larger. Regardless of the exact specification, we see that countries that are elected to the SC are less likely to comply with resolutions after they have been elected.

⁴⁴We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to add bilateral foreign aid from countries other than the US.

⁴⁵See Appendix Table A8. The F stats are fairly large, so the used instruments seem to be relevant.

Table 7: Medium Term Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance					
	OLS		Aid Instrumented			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.0211*	-0.0207*	-0.0329*		-0.0344*	-0.0340*
	(0.00990)	(0.00990)	(0.0155)		(0.0160)	(0.0158)
Security Council				-0.0130	-0.0147	-0.0136
				(0.0124)	(0.0126)	(0.0123)
Short Term Compliance	0.858***	0.857***	0.864***	0.864***	0.864***	0.866***
	(0.00790)	(0.00791)	(0.0135)	(0.0136)	(0.0135)	(0.0140)
Max Depth of Demand	0.115***	0.116***	0.109***	0.109***	0.108***	0.107***
	(0.00617)	(0.00618)	(0.0119)	(0.0120)	(0.0121)	(0.0126)
Log Aid France		-0.00244**	0.00635	0.00675	0.00513	0.00613
		(0.000926)	(0.0192)	(0.0191)	(0.0186)	(0.0189)
Log Aid Germany		0.00252*	0.000588	0.000334	0.00197	0.000754
		(0.00104)	(0.00830)	(0.00816)	(0.00805)	(0.00808)
Log Aid Japan		0.000828	-0.00815	-0.00813	-0.00902	-0.00967
		(0.000923)	(0.0131)	(0.0133)	(0.0135)	(0.0136)
Log Aid UK		-0.00114	0.0351#	0.0350	0.0352	0.0343#
		(0.00102)	(0.0213)	(0.0215)	(0.0215)	(0.0208)
Log Aid US		-0.000214	-0.0245	-0.0246	-0.0241	-0.0241
		(0.000869)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0159)	(0.0156)
Civ War No-Int						-0.0185
						(0.0181)
Civ War Int						0.0128
						(0.00937)
Constant	0.000898	0.000440	0.00757	0.00750	0.00825	0.0101
	(0.00173)	(0.00262)	(0.00607)	(0.00604)	(0.00599)	(0.00617)
Obs	2,637	2,637	2,634	2,634	2,634	2,634

OLS and IV estimation at the country level for the whole sample. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

The effect of election decreases compliance by between 0.02 and 0.03 (depending on specification) on a four-point scale for *the average country*. However, the effect is much larger if we restrict attention to countries who were mentioned in resolutions. Table 8 shows estimates based on this smaller sample: coefficients range from -0.42 to -0.51 , meaning that after election, conditional on being mentioned in at least one resolution, countries decrease their compliance by up to half a point on a four-point scale.

Columns (4)-(6) of Tables 7 and 8 show that there is no effect of SC membership on medium term compliance after controlling for short term compliance. This is because the incentive to shirk increases only in the year that countries are actually elected, and thus we would not expect medium term compliance to change relative to short term compliance merely by virtue of the fact that a country is on the SC. The results are robust to the inclusion of relevant covariates, even after instrumenting foreign bilateral aid.⁴⁶

5.3 Number of Resolutions

Vreeland and Dreher (2014) show that countries are elected to the SC on a rotation basis. This means that countries that held a SC seat in the immediate past are unlikely to be elected, and countries that have not held a seat for a long time are much more likely to be elected. We test whether the UN puts countries who are up for election on a trial, by giving them extra tasks. That is, we consider the relationship between the number of resolutions that request an action by a country and the rotation norm measure.

⁴⁶Appendix Table A9 shows that excluding the short term compliance from the covariates does not change our results, Table A10 shows that our results are robust to looking at the change in compliance, Table A11 shows that even in the African region, where countries coordinate on their rotation for SC seats, compliance falls after election, and Table A12 shows that our results are also robust to an ordered logit specification. The number of observations for Table A12 is larger, because the unit of observation is individual resolutions rather than a country-year pair.

Table 8: Medium Term Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003, on the Subsample with Resolutions

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance					
	OLS		Aid Instrumented			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.423*	-0.470**	-0.501*		-0.497*	-0.510*
	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.239)		(0.234)	(0.210)
Security Council				-0.0626	-0.0705	-0.0856
				(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.164)
Short Term Compliance	0.816***	0.777***	0.783***	0.793***	0.776***	0.742***
	(0.0407)	(0.0420)	(0.0948)	(0.0945)	(0.0945)	(0.0729)
Max Depth of Demand	0.0361	0.0144	0.0185	0.0486	0.0144	0.0201
	(0.0552)	(0.0552)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.101)
Log Aid France		-0.0390**	-0.151#	-0.134#	-0.152#	-0.131*
		(0.0144)	(0.0827)	(0.0814)	(0.0813)	(0.0653)
Log Aid Germany		0.0444**	-0.0482	-0.0557	-0.0386	0.0145
		(0.0170)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.112)
Log Aid Japan		0.0127	0.0794	0.0807	0.0780	0.0967
		(0.0182)	(0.0814)	(0.0796)	(0.0801)	(0.0731)
Log Aid UK		-0.0161	-0.0215	-0.0315	-0.0208	-0.0414
		(0.0151)	(0.0722)	(0.0708)	(0.0708)	(0.0613)
Log Aid US		-0.00689	-0.0552	-0.0260	-0.0493	-0.0133
		(0.0145)	(0.0959)	(0.0923)	(0.0951)	(0.0612)
Civ War No-Int						-0.0252
						(0.211)
Civ War Int						0.0883
						(0.0955)
Constant	0.322	0.444*	0.967#	0.769	0.951#	0.674
	(0.198)	(0.202)	(0.545)	(0.525)	(0.536)	(0.424)
Obs	172	172	172	172	172	172

OLS and IV estimation at the country level for countries with resolutions. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

$$\text{LogNumberResolutions}_{c,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{RotationNorm}_{c,t} + \beta_2 \text{LogBattleDeaths}_{c,t} + \gamma \text{Controls}_{c,t} \quad (4)$$

where for a given year t and a country c , $\text{LogNumberResolutions}_{c,t}$ is the log of the number of resolutions naming the country plus one (to avoid $\log(0)$); $\text{LogBattleDeaths}_{c,t}$ is the log of the number of battle deaths plus one; and $\text{Controls}_{c,t}$ are a set of relevant covariates including war indicators as well as political and economical variables.

Column (2) of Table 9 shows that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the rotation norm and the log number of resolutions making requests of a specific country. The standard deviation for the rotation norm is 0.86, and thus the coefficient of 0.1 in Column (2) means that a one-standard deviation change in the value of rotation norm would lead to a change of approximately 8.6% in the number of resolutions that a country was asked to comply with. This corresponds to an increase of slightly more than one resolution in the case of a country that has been named in 13 resolutions, which is the yearly average number of resolutions among countries included in IPI's data set.⁴⁷

Columns (3), (4), and (5) show that this relationship is mostly unchanged when controlling for the variables used in Vreeland and Dreher (2014) as well as region fixed effects. The lowest estimated coefficient is that in Column (4), which corresponds to a change of 0.4 resolutions for a one standard deviation change in the rotation norm for a country that has been named in 13 resolutions.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Column (1) shows that UNSC resolutions are responsive to the size of the conflicts. Variables associated with 'being in war' clearly have a positive effect on the number of resolutions place upon a country. Therefore, a potential issue might be that not being elected for a long time might be related with such war variables. Thus, we include in Columns (2) - (5) the regression dummies for war and the number of battle deaths. These columns show that the rotation norm has a significant and positive effect on the number of resolutions beyond what war variables might explain.

⁴⁸We thank to an anonymous referee who requested us to re-run this regression exclusively for the African region. Appendix Table A13 and A14 shows that the effect of the rotation norm is stronger in Africa, and the UN is more

Table 9: Log Number of Resolutions by Country from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Log Number of Resolutions				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rotation Norm		0.106*** (0.0153)	0.0907*** (0.0165)	0.0423# (0.0216)	0.0716** (0.0220)
Log Battle Deaths	0.0534*** (0.0137)	0.0505*** (0.0143)	0.0401** (0.0143)	0.0414** (0.0148)	0.0389** (0.0145)
Civ War	0.841*** (0.114)	0.673*** (0.119)	0.654*** (0.118)	0.405** (0.127)	0.363** (0.124)
Int C War	0.0934 (0.0781)	0.0821 (0.0813)	0.122 (0.0807)	0.127 (0.0836)	0.154# (0.0819)
Security Council	-0.00852 (0.0482)	0.0419 (0.0674)	0.0602 (0.0667)	0.0677 (0.0676)	0.0340 (0.0663)
Log GNI/pc		-0.0581*** (0.00824)	-0.0409*** (0.0116)	-0.0350* (0.0168)	5.23e-05 (0.0173)
Log Population		-0.00485 (0.0106)	0.00112 (0.0116)	-0.00779 (0.0140)	0.0173 (0.0141)
Log Area		0.00945 (0.00815)	0.00393 (0.00818)	-0.00103 (0.00973)	-0.00752 (0.00964)
Constant	0.0689*** (0.0126)	0.377** (0.133)	0.307* (0.155)	0.706** (0.258)	0.0934 (0.273)
Observations	2,637	2,424	2,411	2,092	2,092
Main D&V	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Region F.E.	No	No	No	No	Yes

OLS estimation of the number of resolutions as a function of the number of battle deaths and the rotation norm, at the country level. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#). Regional groups are defined by the UN, The dummy for Western Europe was omitted.

The coefficient for civil wars with no international consequences has a positive and significant effect, while the coefficient for civil wars with international consequences is not significant. The most likely explanation for this is that our data includes only civil war resolutions. Once an issue becomes international, the UN will likely pass resolutions in a category that is not coded by IPI.

One alternative explanation for the results in Table 9 would be that the number of resolutions decreases as a post-service compensation after countries leave the SC. There are two arguments against this idea: (i) this would imply that after excluding countries currently in the SC, the rotation norm should indeed have a negative effect on the number of resolutions, as this alternative hypothesis would imply that there is a decrease only when the country just left the SC and this happens when the rotation norm is near zero (it increases the longer a country has not been in the SC); (ii) an easy test to rule out this alternative hypothesis would be to add a lagged SC dummy to our model. In appendix Table A15, we show that this dummy is not significant. We thus believe that our proposed explanation (that the UN puts countries on trial when they are due to election) is the most reasonable explanation for the results shown in Table 9.

As an additional robustness check, we consider a negative binomial model for the number of resolutions (rather than using logged resolutions as in Table 9). Table A16 shows the results from this negative binomial model. Our main result (the rotation norm has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of resolutions) remains the same in this specification.

responsive to conflicts and the number of deaths in that regions as well.

6 Conclusions

We have shown that election to the SC offers incentives for countries to comply with SC resolutions. In the political economy literature, the response of politicians to incentives for re-election is a frequent subject of study, some examples are [Nordhaus \(1975\)](#) and [Dick and Lott Jr \(1993\)](#). However, to our knowledge, the incentives provided by potential election to the SC have not been studied in the empirical literature.

Theoretical models predict a relationship between compliance with UN resolutions and SC seat elections: a verifiable cost of compliance with resolutions at the moment of elections should increase the probability of election. We measure this cost by the difficulty of the task requested by the resolution, and the interaction of the number of resolutions with the level of compliance. Once a country has been elected, there are no immediate incentives to maintain compliance. Thus, post-election compliance (medium-term compliance) is expected to fall for elected countries. Finally, countries that have not held a SC seat, and thus are due for election, are tested by being named in a larger number of resolutions.

Our event study framework allows us to claim the direction of causality to answer to the question *why do countries comply?* Previous literature has analyzed compliance in other IOs at the qualitative and quantitative level. However, at the quantitative level, the majority of those studies focus on a related, yet different question: *what happens when countries do not comply?* That question makes sense in IOs such as the IMF and WB where benefits of membership are private (i.e. my country gets a loan). However, the UN is an example where the benefits are collective (i.e. there is no war), and thus, there are weaker incentives to comply.

One aspect of SC elections that we do not consider in this paper is that countries are competing

with each other for a fixed number of SC seats. If countries are elected (at least partially) based on their performance in complying with SC resolutions, then election to the SC resembles a tournament. Future research could thus consider whether models such as [Lazear and Rosen \(1981\)](#) could be useful in explaining decisions regarding compliance and elections to the SC.

Our findings are explained by the idea that, roughly speaking, countries do the bare minimum just to get elected at the SC. That is the reason why the UN increases the number of resolutions addressed to countries that are due to elections and why compliance falls after election. On the one hand, this finding is pessimistic in that it suggests substantial limits on the degree of international cooperation that could be obtained via an international organization such as the UN. On the other hand, our results show that the UN *has* figured out a mechanism that ensures some degree of cooperation and almost global participation. Moreover, via these incentives, the UN attains something that none of its precursor (Permanent Court of Arbitration and League of Nations) has accomplished: Since the creation of the UN, we are living in a peaceful world, compared to the rest of human history. This is – at least partially – explained by a carefully designed mechanism that attains compliance even in the face of substantial constraints.

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A Additional Tables

Table A1: Distribution of Power

Years in Power	Number of Countries
74 years(*)	5
12 - 22 years	8
8 - 10 years	16
5 - 7 years	27
3 - 4 years	29
1 - 2 years	41
Never	67
Total	193

As of 2018. (*) The five permanent members also hold veto power.

Table A2: Top 20 non-permanent countries most often in the SC

Years in Power	Country	Region
22	Japan	Asia
20	Brazil	Latin America
18	Argentina	Latin America
14	Pakistan	Asia
14	India	Asia
14	Colombia	Latin America
13	Italy	WEO
12	Canada	WEO
10	Nigeria	Africa
10	Germany	WEO
10	Netherlands	WEO
10	Poland	Eastern Europe
10	Chile	Latin America
10	Australia	WEO
10	Venezuela	Latin America
10	Panama	Latin America
10	Belgium	WEO
10	Spain	WEO
9	Peru	Latin America
9	Egypt	Africa

As of 2018. The five permanent members were excluded from the ranking. Some non-European countries have been included by the UN in the Western European group (WEO): Australia, Canada and Israel. The classification of regions has been changed once in 1966, but we use the current classification for simplicity.

Table A3: Dates of SC Elections

Membership starting in	Election
1989	26-Oct-88
1990	18-Oct-89
1991	1-Nov-90
1992	16-Oct-91
1993	27-Oct-92
1994	29-Oct-93
1995	20-Oct-94
1996	8-Nov-95
1997	21-Oct-96
1998	14-Oct-97
1999	8-Oct-98
2000	14-Oct-99
2001	10-Oct-00
2002	8-Oct-01
2003	27-Sep-02

In general, elections happened at the end of the year. Therefore, most of short term compliance of a given year is observed at the moment of election. On the other hand, medium term compliance is usually only partially observed.

Table A4: SC Elections from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Elected				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Max Depth of Demand	2.406*	2.424*	2.757**	2.911**	3.871*
	(0.999)	(1.009)	(1.060)	(1.124)	(1.694)
Number of resolutions Depth 1	0.333	0.334	0.465	0.739	0.731
	(1.012)	(1.044)	(1.175)	(1.249)	(1.499)
Number of resolutions Depth 2	-0.952	-0.991	-1.032	-1.018	-1.219
	(0.779)	(0.764)	(0.795)	(0.806)	(0.867)
Number of resolutions Depth 3	-1.334	-1.387	-1.576	-1.658	-2.443
	(0.883)	(0.900)	(0.975)	(1.023)	(1.526)
Average Compliance Depth 1	-0.129	-0.171	0.0275	0.257	0.305
	(0.674)	(0.687)	(0.761)	(0.861)	(0.930)
Average Compliance Depth 2	-2.350*	-2.426*	-2.623*	-2.776*	-3.906#
	(1.198)	(1.222)	(1.285)	(1.344)	(2.056)
Average Compliance Depth 3	-4.294#	-4.249#	-4.453#	-4.653#	-6.264#
	(2.238)	(2.221)	(2.381)	(2.535)	(3.754)
Sum Comp Depth 1	-0.265	-0.270	-0.398	-0.569	-0.758
	(0.574)	(0.590)	(0.704)	(0.799)	(1.020)
Sum Comp Depth 2	0.704#	0.738#	0.793#	0.800#	1.043#
	(0.414)	(0.417)	(0.426)	(0.438)	(0.577)
Sum Comp Depth 3	0.667	0.676	0.739	0.794	1.163
	(0.476)	(0.481)	(0.527)	(0.553)	(0.802)
Civ War No-Int		-0.427	-0.0285	0.385	0.815
		(1.205)	(1.257)	(1.329)	(1.266)
Civ War Int		0.239	-0.0349	0.141	0.281
		(0.339)	(0.372)	(0.396)	(0.427)
Rotation Norm			0.122	0.320	0.430#
			(0.203)	(0.217)	(0.238)
Log GNI/pc			0.539***	0.582***	0.710**
			(0.122)	(0.163)	(0.228)
Log Population			0.593***	0.527***	0.609***
			(0.123)	(0.141)	(0.179)
Log Area			-0.0702	-0.0934	-0.173
			(0.0942)	(0.0984)	(0.128)
Observations	2,458	2,458	2,349	2,336	2,020
War Data	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Rank-ordered logistic estimation at the country level, for each UN region and and year. The number of observations is smaller than that of Table 6, because using this model does not require to trick the data by duplicating elections when two countries are elected. Instead, the rank-ordered logit model allows for any ordering from the choice set, allows for ties and ‘understands’ one as elected and zero as not elected. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5: Average Semi-elasticities: SC Elections from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Elected				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Max Depth of Demand	2.365*	2.387*	2.707**	2.855**	3.789*
	(0.977)	(0.987)	(1.032)	(1.090)	(1.647)
Number of resolutions Depth 1	0.300	0.297	0.404	0.657	0.622
	(0.949)	(0.976)	(1.127)	(1.204)	(1.454)
Number of resolutions Depth 2	-0.975	-1.019	-1.060	-1.047	-1.253
	(0.781)	(0.764)	(0.793)	(0.798)	(0.855)
Number of resolutions Depth 3	-1.295	-1.349	-1.525	-1.602	-2.360
	(0.852)	(0.868)	(0.939)	(0.985)	(1.476)
Average Compliance Depth 1	-0.135	-0.180	0.00587	0.222	0.250
	(0.633)	(0.646)	(0.725)	(0.825)	(0.900)
Average Compliance Depth 2	-2.307*	-2.386*	-2.572*	-2.721*	-3.825#
	(1.172)	(1.197)	(1.253)	(1.305)	(2.001)
Average Compliance Depth 3	-4.264#	-4.229#	-4.413#	-4.599#	-6.166#
	(2.199)	(2.181)	(2.325)	(2.463)	(3.656)
Sum Comp Depth 1	-0.234	-0.237	-0.348	-0.503	-0.664
	(0.523)	(0.536)	(0.668)	(0.763)	(0.980)
Sum Comp Depth 2	0.713#	0.750#	0.803#	0.810#	1.051#
	(0.415)	(0.418)	(0.425)	(0.434)	(0.566)
Sum Comp Depth 3	0.639	0.648	0.704	0.755	1.109
	(0.459)	(0.463)	(0.507)	(0.532)	(0.777)
Civ War No-Int		-0.444	-0.0518	0.346	0.768
		(1.180)	(1.229)	(1.302)	(1.237)
Civ War Int		0.234	-0.0313	0.145	0.281
		(0.330)	(0.361)	(0.386)	(0.414)
Rotation Norm			0.119	0.314	0.424#
			(0.197)	(0.210)	(0.231)
Log GNI/pc			0.526***	0.570***	0.693**
			(0.119)	(0.159)	(0.221)
Log Population			0.581***	0.519***	0.598***
			(0.120)	(0.138)	(0.174)
Log Area			-0.0706	-0.0937	-0.170
			(0.0914)	(0.0955)	(0.124)
Observations	2,688	2,688	2,585	2,541	2,099
War Data	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	No	Yes

Conditional logistic for the semi-elasticities at the country level, for each UN region and and year. Eligible countries are not current member and members not leaving the SC in the year of analysis. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Elected* is a dummy variable for the election of a non-permanent member to the SC. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#). Some countries don't have all variables available. Column (1) has all possible observations. However, the panel is still imbalanced since the number of eligible countries changes through time.

Table A6: Election Model, including highly competitive elections

VARIABLES	Elected				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Max Depth of Demand	2.413*	2.436*	2.754**	2.897**	3.848*
	(0.990)	(1.011)	(1.045)	(1.100)	(1.655)
Max Depth of Demand × Competitive	0.208	0.138	0.277	0.389	0.362
	(0.919)	(0.975)	(1.036)	(1.103)	(1.240)
Number of resolutions Depth 1	0.318	0.316	0.460	0.774	0.757
	(0.994)	(1.021)	(1.199)	(1.301)	(1.564)
Number of resolutions Depth 2	-0.896	-0.973	-0.929	-0.849	-1.071
	(0.884)	(0.920)	(0.960)	(0.984)	(1.117)
Number of resolutions Depth 3	-1.373	-1.413	-1.624#	-1.725#	-2.500#
	(0.884)	(0.904)	(0.969)	(1.016)	(1.488)
Average Compliance Depth 1	-0.142	-0.184	0.0238	0.287	0.340
	(0.672)	(0.679)	(0.775)	(0.886)	(0.966)
Average Compliance Depth 2	-2.393*	-2.460*	-2.663*	-2.817*	-3.934*
	(1.196)	(1.221)	(1.268)	(1.319)	(1.995)
Average Compliance Depth 3	-4.270#	-4.260#	-4.386#	-4.548#	-6.134#
	(2.253)	(2.288)	(2.378)	(2.490)	(3.678)
Sum Comp Depth 1	-0.252	-0.253	-0.397	-0.605	-0.790
	(0.564)	(0.574)	(0.734)	(0.860)	(1.086)
Sum Comp Depth 2	0.684	0.736	0.750	0.727	0.980
	(0.456)	(0.484)	(0.496)	(0.508)	(0.654)
Sum Comp Depth 3	0.665	0.672	0.740	0.801	1.163
	(0.462)	(0.470)	(0.509)	(0.535)	(0.775)
Civ War No-Int		-0.434	0.00793	0.464	0.866
		(1.219)	(1.270)	(1.337)	(1.273)
Civ War Int		0.239	-0.0361	0.143	0.287
		(0.339)	(0.372)	(0.398)	(0.428)
Rotation Norm			0.122	0.325	0.440#
			(0.202)	(0.216)	(0.238)
Log GNI/pc			0.541***	0.589***	0.720**
			(0.123)	(0.164)	(0.229)
Log Population			0.597***	0.533***	0.618***
			(0.123)	(0.142)	(0.180)
Log Area			-0.0719	-0.0956	-0.175
			(0.0941)	(0.0983)	(0.128)
Observations	2,688	2,688	2,585	2,541	2,099
War Data	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	No	Yes

A region and year pair is competitive if elections go beyond the first round. In our sample, these are: Africa: 1993, 2000; Eastern Europe: 1993, 1999; Latin America: 1996, 2001; Western Europe: 1992, 2000.

In Table A7, we estimate a model of elections for SC seats similar to Section 5.1, but with an endogenous selection probit-probit model of countries that are requested to comply on elections, with score function: $Resolution_{c,t}^{2,3} = \beta_0 + \gamma X_{c,t} + u_{c,t}$, where $Resolution^{2,3}$ indicates if a country was placed at least one resolution of depth 2 or 3, and X are covariates decided before the a resolution is enacted. Moreover, we allow for the error term in both models to be correlated.

Table A7: Election Model, Using Endogenous Selection of Countries with Resolutions

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
	election	resolution ^{2,3}	election	resolution ^{2,3}	election	resolution ^{2,3}
Max Depth of Demand	0.864# (0.522)		1.473* (0.655)		1.215* (0.525)	
Number of resolutions Depth 1	0.149 (0.519)		0.217 (0.532)		0.197 (0.562)	
Number of resolutions Depth 2	-0.414 (0.339)		-0.498 (0.369)		-0.477 (0.376)	
Number of resolutions Depth 3	-0.569 (0.404)		-0.657 (0.424)		-0.632 (0.434)	
Average Compliance Depth 1	-0.0324 (0.341)		-0.0956 (0.355)		-0.0337 (0.352)	
Average Compliance Depth 2	-0.982# (0.536)		-0.979# (0.549)		-1.006# (0.552)	
Average Compliance Depth 3	-1.633# (0.971)		-1.976# (1.027)		-1.851# (1.023)	
Sum Comp Depth 1	-0.124 (0.294)		-0.144 (0.297)		-0.149 (0.317)	
Sum Comp Depth 2	0.306# (0.181)		0.344# (0.192)		0.339# (0.195)	
Sum Comp Depth 3	0.282 (0.224)		0.314 (0.230)		0.302 (0.238)	
Civ War No-Int		1.305*** (0.216)	-0.262 (0.611)	1.328*** (0.215)	-0.0782 (0.544)	-0.0782 (0.544)
Civ War Int		0.982*** (0.131)	-0.152 (0.167)	1.014*** (0.131)	-0.121 (0.165)	-0.121 (0.165)
Rotation Norm		0.375*** (0.0938)	-0.0536 (0.0834)	0.393*** (0.0944)	-0.0430 (0.0852)	-0.0430 (0.0852)
Log GNI/pc		-0.150* (0.0720)	0.134*** (0.0374)	-0.127# (0.0731)	0.129*** (0.0373)	0.129*** (0.0373)
Log Population		0.0232 (0.0711)	0.191*** (0.0494)	0.0151 (0.0714)	0.191*** (0.0495)	0.191*** (0.0495)
Log Area		0.000789 (0.0493)	-0.00147 (0.0394)	0.000250 (0.0491)	-0.00136 (0.0395)	-0.00136 (0.0395)
Observations	2,637	2,637	2,424	2,424	2,424	2,424
War Data	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Columns (1a), (2a) and (3a) estimate the main regression, and Columns (1b), (2b), (3b) estimate a model for which countries are requested to comply on at least one resolution of depth 2 or 3.
p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table A8: First Stage Regressions for Aid in Table 7

VARIABLES	Log Aid France (1)	Log Aid Germany (2)	Log Aid Japan (3)	Log Aid UK (4)	Log Aid US (5)
Log GNI/pc (lagged)	-0.309*** (0.0256)	-0.296*** (0.0249)	-0.352*** (0.0267)	-0.153*** (0.0242)	-0.265*** (0.0296)
Log Population (lagged)	0.184*** (0.0332)	0.392*** (0.0323)	0.322*** (0.0346)	0.385*** (0.0313)	0.473*** (0.0383)
Log Area (lagged)	-0.00402 (0.0264)	-0.0544* (0.0256)	-0.113*** (0.0275)	-0.121*** (0.0249)	-0.116*** (0.0304)
Donor's Polity			-238.5 (1,699)	-1,338 (11,586)	
Donor's Polity × Donor's GDP	198.0 (2,469)		22.96 (163.1)	4,022 (4,118)	9.961 (8.574)
Donor's Democracy × Donor's GDP	-199.6 (2,445)	2.003 (1,809)	-14.03 (100.8)	-4,031 (4,101)	
Constant	-2,377 (11,772)	-7,915 (11,435)	-6,467 (12,258)	386.3 (11,093)	5,502 (13,580)
Observations	2,634	2,634	2,634	2,634	2,634
F-stat	23.856	47.890	29.118	24.659	33.815

First stage regressions for Aid in Table 7. Only the donor's own instrument are displayed for brevity; however, the full set of all five donor's instruments were used. Some of the instruments were omitted due to colinearity. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A9: Medium Term Compliance, not controlled for Short Term Compliance

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.672* (0.305)		-0.668* (0.306)	-0.620* (0.301)	-0.687* (0.297)	-0.754* (0.305)
Security Council		0.109 (0.253)	0.0912 (0.250)	-0.00961 (0.248)	-0.221 (0.341)	-0.231 (0.342)
Rotation Norm					0.135** (0.0442)	0.0607 (0.0594)
Max Depth of Demand	-0.292** (0.0969)	-0.272** (0.0979)	-0.290** (0.0972)	-0.251** (0.0964)	-0.242* (0.0972)	-0.206* (0.0983)
Civ War No-Int				-0.224# (0.133)	-0.115 (0.139)	-0.0254 (0.146)
Civ War Int				-0.259** (0.0946)	-0.166# (0.0990)	-0.138 (0.102)
Log GNI/pc						0.0563 (0.0581)
Log Population						-0.0163 (0.0745)
Log Area						-0.0687# (0.0404)
Constant	2.941*** (0.273)	2.865*** (0.275)	2.934*** (0.274)	2.973*** (0.270)	2.730*** (0.275)	3.448** (1.120)
Observations	172	172	172	172	164	164

OLS estimation. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A10: Change from Short to Medium Term Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Change in Compliance					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.423* (0.167)		-0.424* (0.167)	-0.421* (0.168)	-0.459** (0.167)	-0.546** (0.171)
Security Council		-0.0325 (0.139)	-0.0426 (0.137)	-0.0442 (0.139)	-0.0211 (0.192)	-0.0652 (0.192)
Rotation Norm					0.0754** (0.0250)	0.0196 (0.0333)
Short Term Compliance	-0.184*** (0.0407)	-0.176*** (0.0414)	-0.184*** (0.0409)	-0.183*** (0.0426)	-0.197*** (0.0434)	-0.201*** (0.0434)
Max Depth of Demand	0.0361 (0.0552)	0.0505 (0.0560)	0.0356 (0.0554)	0.0371 (0.0559)	0.0171 (0.0563)	0.0330 (0.0566)
Civ War No-Int				-0.0274 (0.0751)	0.00385 (0.0785)	0.0593 (0.0816)
Civ War Int				0.00860 (0.0547)	0.0615 (0.0569)	0.0912 (0.0586)
Log GNI/pc						0.0708* (0.0325)
Log Population						-0.0147 (0.0417)
Log Area						-0.0202 (0.0228)
Constant	0.322 (0.198)	0.256 (0.200)	0.323 (0.198)	0.318 (0.205)	0.278 (0.204)	0.345 (0.649)
Observations	172	172	172	172	164	164

OLS estimation for the change in compliance from Short to Medium term. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Depth i* and *Short Term Compliance j* are dummy variables for the difficulty of the task (measured between 1 and 3), and the compliance within one year (measured between 1 and 4).

Table A11: African Region, Medium Term Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.529** (0.168)		-0.529** (0.169)	-0.552** (0.171)	-0.616*** (0.177)	-0.624** (0.188)
Security Council		0.0127 (0.128)	-0.00171 (0.123)	0.0204 (0.126)	-0.00275 (0.178)	-0.0214 (0.191)
Rotation Norm					0.136 (0.0838)	0.174 (0.106)
Short Term Compliance	0.785*** (0.0638)	0.796*** (0.0676)	0.785*** (0.0649)	0.786*** (0.0662)	0.808*** (0.0693)	0.799*** (0.0732)
Max Depth of Demand	-0.121# (0.0718)	-0.105 (0.0751)	-0.121# (0.0721)	-0.134# (0.0736)	-0.151* (0.0750)	-0.147# (0.0789)
Civ War No-Int				0.0924 (0.0907)	0.0836 (0.0935)	0.0777 (0.100)
Civ War Int				0.0290 (0.0649)	0.0327 (0.0664)	0.0118 (0.0761)
Log GNI/pc						0.00405 (0.0464)
Log Population						0.0248 (0.0493)
Log Area						-0.0181 (0.0317)
Constant	0.772** (0.279)	0.691* (0.292)	0.772** (0.281)	0.776** (0.287)	0.699* (0.288)	0.506 (0.767)
Observations	104	104	104	104	98	98

OLS estimation at the country level only for the African region. The dummy variable variable SC is always zero outside the African Region, thus it does not make sense to replicate this table for all regions excluding Africa. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A12: Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003 at the Resolution Level

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Depth 1	0.381** (0.128)	0.313** (0.120)	0.381** (0.128)	0.322* (0.134)
Depth 2	0.260* (0.105)	0.198* (0.0980)	0.260* (0.105)	0.251* (0.109)
Short Term Compliance 1	-6.967*** (0.244)	-7.037*** (0.230)	-6.967*** (0.244)	-6.925*** (0.256)
Short Term Compliance 2	-4.772*** (0.228)	-4.861*** (0.216)	-4.772*** (0.228)	-4.659*** (0.239)
Short Term Compliance 3	-2.804*** (0.218)	-2.880*** (0.207)	-2.804*** (0.218)	-2.773*** (0.230)
Elected	-1.029** (0.375)		-1.029** (0.375)	-1.086** (0.382)
Security Council		0.0142 (0.225)	0.00360 (0.226)	-0.0372 (0.317)
Rotation Norm				0.221** (0.0711)
Log GNI/pc				0.0506 (0.0684)
Log Population				0.0967 (0.0829)
Log Area				-0.0800* (0.0396)
Constant 1	-6.264*** (0.246)	-6.340*** (0.233)	-6.263*** (0.246)	-5.124*** (1.171)
Constant 2	-2.789*** (0.225)	-2.945*** (0.214)	-2.789*** (0.226)	-1.645 (1.168)
Constant 3	-0.269 (0.187)	-0.323# (0.174)	-0.268 (0.187)	0.881 (1.161)
Observations	2,152	2,465	2,152	1,992

Ordered logistic estimation at the resolution level. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. In this table, the unit of measure is a resolution. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Depth i* and *Short Term Compliance j* are dummy variables for the difficulty of the task (measured between 1 and 3), and the compliance within one year (measured between 1 and 4).

Table A13: African Region, Log Number of Resolutions by Country from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Log Number of Resolutions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rotation Norm		0.279** (0.0873)	0.210* (0.0897)	0.128 (0.0969)
Log Battle Deaths	0.0881* (0.0351)	0.111** (0.0370)	0.0615# (0.0368)	0.0663# (0.0385)
Civ War No-Int	0.523* (0.258)	0.263 (0.269)	0.404 (0.262)	0.162 (0.275)
Civ War Int	0.263 (0.199)	0.0691 (0.210)	0.261 (0.208)	0.299 (0.212)
Security Council	0.0851 (0.128)	0.105 (0.177)	0.140 (0.173)	0.130 (0.176)
Log GNI/pc		-0.140*** (0.0324)	-0.102** (0.0371)	-0.0741 (0.0477)
Log Population		0.0351 (0.0355)	0.0591 (0.0393)	0.0200 (0.0432)
Log Area		-0.00773 (0.0238)	-0.0250 (0.0242)	-0.00117 (0.0283)
Constant	0.125*** (0.0350)	0.429 (0.513)	0.315 (0.615)	0.777 (0.728)
Observations	790	743	741	670
Main D&V	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	Yes
Regional Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No

OLS estimation of the number of resolutions as a function of the number of battle deaths and the rotation norm, at the country level, only for the African region. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#). Regional groups are defined by the UN, The dummy for Western Europe was omitted.

Table A14: Excluding the African Region, Log Number of Resolutions by Country from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Log Number of Resolutions				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rotation Norm		0.137*** (0.0112)	0.117*** (0.0122)	0.0651*** (0.0153)	0.0567*** (0.0156)
Log Battle Deaths	0.0342** (0.0115)	0.0202# (0.0114)	0.0217# (0.0114)	0.0264* (0.0113)	0.0266* (0.0113)
Civ War No-Int	1.084*** (0.111)	0.831*** (0.116)	0.793*** (0.115)	0.532*** (0.121)	0.528*** (0.121)
Civ War Int	-0.0564 (0.0646)	0.00471 (0.0649)	0.0172 (0.0647)	-0.0262 (0.0641)	-0.0289 (0.0641)
Security Council	-0.0576 (0.0388)	-0.0401 (0.0532)	-0.0246 (0.0528)	-0.0160 (0.0505)	-0.0133 (0.0505)
Log GNI/pc		-0.0117# (0.00688)	0.00601 (0.00939)	0.0219 (0.0139)	0.0229 (0.0145)
Log Population		0.0173* (0.00822)	0.00921 (0.00891)	0.00697 (0.0108)	0.00650 (0.0111)
Log Area		0.00250 (0.00633)	0.00159 (0.00632)	-0.0108 (0.00726)	-0.00955 (0.00734)
Constant	0.0490*** (0.0100)	-0.296** (0.109)	-0.293* (0.126)	-0.164 (0.204)	-0.157 (0.208)
Observations	1,818	1,681	1,670	1,422	1,422
Main D&V	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Regional Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes

OLS estimation of the number of resolutions as a function of the number of battle deaths and the rotation norm, at the country level, only for the African region. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from [Vreeland and Dreher \(2014\)](#). Regional groups are defined by the UN, The dummy for Western Europe was omitted.

Table A15: Log Number of Resolutions by Country from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Log Number of Resolutions				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rotation Norm		0.112*** (0.0178)	0.0891*** (0.0194)	0.0413# (0.0247)	0.0745** (0.0250)
Log Battle Deaths	0.0709*** (0.0159)	0.0681*** (0.0164)	0.0587*** (0.0163)	0.0536** (0.0167)	0.0519** (0.0163)
Civ War No-Int	0.771*** (0.141)	0.677*** (0.144)	0.635*** (0.142)	0.481** (0.150)	0.401** (0.146)
Civ War Int	0.0430 (0.0900)	0.0203 (0.0933)	0.0584 (0.0924)	0.117 (0.0944)	0.135 (0.0921)
Security Council	-0.00190 (0.0545)	0.0771 (0.0762)	0.0977 (0.0753)	0.0938 (0.0760)	0.0499 (0.0744)
Security Council (t-2)	-0.0493 (0.0542)	0.0749 (0.0767)	0.0853 (0.0762)	0.0434 (0.0780)	0.0295 (0.0761)
Log GNI/pc		-0.0680*** (0.00917)	-0.0596*** (0.0133)	-0.0528** (0.0191)	-0.00693 (0.0196)
Log Population		-0.00880 (0.0119)	-0.00748 (0.0132)	-0.0152 (0.0159)	0.0125 (0.0159)
Log Area		0.0119 (0.00915)	0.00484 (0.00915)	-0.00120 (0.0109)	-0.00885 (0.0108)
Constant	0.0840*** (0.0146)	0.489** (0.151)	0.270 (0.173)	0.609* (0.290)	-0.127 (0.309)
Observations	2,259	2,106	2,099	1,824	1,824
Main D&V	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Regional Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes

The same as Table 9, but adding a 2-period lagged SC dummy that mirrors the two-year term at the SC. This tables justifies our hypothesis as opposed to an alternative hypothesis in which the reduction in the number of resolutions comes from post-service compensation, rather than rotation. # p< 0.1, * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001.

Table A16: Negative Binomial Number of Resolutions by Country from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Number of Resolutions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rotation Norm	1.325*** (0.164)	1.358*** (0.219)	1.047** (0.367)
Log Battle Deaths	0.369* (0.178)	0.254 (0.177)	0.184 (0.186)
Civ War No-Int	-0.529 (1.201)	0.963 (1.260)	1.693 (1.405)
Civ War Int	-0.763 (0.989)	0.159 (0.975)	1.409 (1.005)
Security Council	1.358# (0.737)	1.456# (0.779)	1.860* (0.848)
Log GNI/pc	-1.298*** (0.143)	-0.740*** (0.180)	-0.687** (0.244)
Log Population	0.271# (0.158)	0.0674 (0.178)	-0.404 (0.250)
Log Area	0.177# (0.106)	0.184 (0.119)	0.421** (0.161)
Constant	-0.256 (2.261)	-0.675 (2.620)	4.877 (4.277)
Observations	2,424	2,411	2,092
Main D&V	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	Yes

The same as Table 9, but using a negative binomial estimation instead of a log-log with respect to battle deaths. # $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

B Mathematical Motivation

Maggi and Morelli (2006) and Caro-Burnett (2020) study the intersection of a repeated game and a dynamic mechanism without monetary transfers. In those models, the N members of an IO have independent stochastic and private preferences y_i either in favor or against taking a collective action. Namely, with probability p , country i would get payoff $y_i = \bar{y}_i$ and with probability $1 - p$, country i would get payoff $y_i = \underline{y}_i$, such that $\bar{y}_i > 0 > \underline{y}_i$. If the collective action is implemented, countries receive their privately known payoff. If the collective action is not implemented, everyone receives zero. Using a utilitarian approach, if $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i > 0$, the members of the organization should cooperate and take the action. This rule is called the first best.

However, there are two difficulties that prevent the implementation of the first best: (i) countries want cooperation when they have a favorable shock and do not want to cooperate when they have an unfavorable shock. Moreover, (ii) any mechanism that compensates countries with negative shocks, generates a problem of misrepresentation of preferences.

In repeated games, the next period's payoff is worth $0 < \delta < 1$ as much as the current payoff. Thus, a standard solution of the above problem is that for δ close enough to 1, if the average payoff of blindly cooperating is high enough, a temporary negative shock can be compensated with the (self-fulfilled) promise that everyone is going to behave nicely in the future.

Caro-Burnett (2020) shows that under condition that roughly mimic the UN, when δ is not large enough to implement the first best, but is moderately high, the best attainable mechanism chooses a council to vote on whether to implement the action. This council is composed of the countries that make the 'initial offer' (the P5, for the UN case) and countries that are tempted to renege from their obligations. Namely, if there are N_A countries who created the organization and made a 'take it or

leave it' offer to other $N_B = N - N_A$ countries:

Proposition (Corollary 1 and Remark 2 in [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#)). *Under parameter restrictions described in [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#), which include δ moderately high:*

- *The best attainable mechanism can be implemented by a voting council, where the first N_A members always have the right to vote and have veto power, a subset \tilde{N} of the remaining N_B members will also have the right to vote, and a number $N^* \leq N_A + \tilde{N}$ of council members must vote in favor to implement an action.*
- *The \tilde{N} members rotate among the type-B countries. Although rotation is ex ante stochastic, it is state dependent.*
- *For a given discount factor δ , let $k(\delta)$ be the number that indicates the minimum number of 'yes' votes of type-B countries required to implement the best feasible action in a given period. Then, the range of pairs (\tilde{N}, N^*) that implement the desired equilibrium satisfies:*

$$\max\{0, k(\delta) - 1 + \tilde{N} - N_B\} < N^* - N_A \leq \min\{k(\delta), \tilde{N}\}$$

- *In particular, for N_B larger than $3N_A$, the above equation is satisfied by setting $N^* = 2N_A - 1$ and $\tilde{N} = 2N_A$. Thus, if $N_A = 5$, and the parameter restrictions in [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) are satisfied, a organization with more than 20 members (satisfied by the UN) can implement the optimal mechanism via a council with $\tilde{N} = 10$ non-permanent members, and a threshold of $N^* = 9$ votes to implement a decision.*

Moreover, propositions 5, 6 and 7 in [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) show which kind of countries are likely to get elected as temporary members to the council. Although the exact rule is very technical, broadly

speaking, the council has enough members who would agree and disagree such that the voting inside the council implements the best feasible action.

In addition, let us denote x as the variable representing the organization's decision, such that $x = 1$ means that the action is fully implemented and $x = 0$ means that the action is not implemented. [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) allows x to take values between 0 and 1, which has a few different interpretation. One of such interpretations is that $0 < x < 1$ represents some degree of compromise between the members of the organization. Another key feature is that, while the first best has either $x = 1$ or $x = 0$, the best attainable mechanism from propositions 5, 6 and 7 in [Caro-Burnett \(2020\)](#) has $0 < x < 1$ for a class of states. Moreover, those states are, broadly speaking, the highly disputed ones (far away from consensus).