| Number |
CREPEDP-50 |
| Publication Date |
February 2019 |
| Title |
Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
|
| Author(s) |
Hitoshi Matsushima
|
| Abstract |
This study investigates infinitely repeated games of a prisoner’s dilemma with additive separability in which the monitoring technology is imperfect and private. Behavioral incentives indicate that, in this setting, a player is not only motivated by pure self-interest but also by reciprocity. Players often become naïve and select an action unconsciously. By focusing on generous tit-for-tat strategies, we characterize a Nash equilibrium with behavioral incentives, termed behavioral equilibrium, in an accuracy-contingent manner. By eliminating the gap between theory and evidence, this study argues that reciprocity plays a substantial role in motivating a player to consciously make decisions.
|
| Keywords |
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Additive Separability, Imperfect Private Monitoring, Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy, Behavioral Equilibrium, Reciprocity, Naïveté. |
| Other information |
Paper in English (18 pages), forthcoming in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics |