Matching Theory – from Gale and Shapley to Trading Networks

Scott Duke Kominers

Course Description. This mini-course introduces the theory and core results of two-sided matching. We then build on those results through a series of successive generalizations, developing first *matching with contracts* and then *trading network matching* models. Throughout, we pay attention to key applications in marketplace design.

References

Day 1: Two-Sided Matching.

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Day 2: Generalized Matching.

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Center for Research in Education and Program Evaluation (CREPE), University of Tokyo.

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Further Reading.

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